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RESTRAINING FORCED MARRIAGE 
Lisa V. Martin* 
Although long a component of international women’s human rights plat-
forms, forced marriage is only presently gaining attention as a critical problem in 
the United States. In recent years, a number of states have considered legislation 
to redress forced and child marriage, most by increasing the minimum age to 
marry and/or mandating judicial approval of marriages involving minors. Al-
though civil marriage reform is important, it alone is insufficient to combat 
forced marriage. Even where civil marriage is limited to adults, minors remain 
vulnerable to forced customary, religious, common law marriages, and marriag-
es consecrated abroad. Further, intended spouses of all ages remain vulnerable 
to conduct intended to coerce their consent to marry. To prevent and redress 
forced marriage, potential victims need ready access to emergency civil injunc-
tive relief. Civil protection orders are the central civil injunctive remedy relied 
upon to address intimate partner violence, rape, and stalking in the United States. 
The expedited and flexible remedies of civil protection orders could also help 
combat forced marriages; however, common legal standards create barriers to 
relief for those vulnerable to forced marriage. This Article is the first to under-
take a detailed evaluation of the viability of civil protection orders to prevent and 
redress forced marriage. Although protection orders show promise as a tool to 
prevent and redress forced marriage in many states, the nuances of the governing 
legal standards reduce the practical utility of the remedy for those who lack ex-
pert guidance. To enhance the accessibility of protection orders in the context of 
forced marriage, this article proposes that states create a new forced marriage 
protection order like that established in the United Kingdom to address the spe-
cific needs of those facing this problem. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Sara Tasneem’s father forced her to marry a stranger in a religious ceremo-
ny in California when she was fifteen years old. At the time, she had no interest 
in marriage. She was focused on school and dreamed of becoming an attorney. 
After her marriage, she was taken out of the country, impregnated, and eventu-
ally returned to the United States to marry in a civil ceremony.1 Sara’s father 
had “an abusive personality,” and she felt unable to defy his plans for her mar-
riage. Had she tried, Sara would have had few options.2 
Although long recognized as a social problem at the international level, 
forced marriage—a marriage that lacks the consent of one or both spouses—is 
only now3 gaining similar attention in the United States.4 No national data ex-
                                                        
1  Ms. Tasneem’s is identified only by her first and middle names to protect her from further 
issues. David Whiting, California Lacks Minimum Marriage Age, Puts Children in Danger, 
ORANGE CTY. REG. (June 15, 2017), http://www.ocregister.com/2017/06/15/california-lacks-
minimum-marriage-age-puts-children-in-danger/ [https://perma.cc/DH9J-ND35]. 
2  Id. 
3  Ramatu Bangura et al., A Closer Look at Forced and Early Marriage in African Immigrant 
Communities in New York City, 3 SAUTI YETU OCCASIONAL REP. 1, 1 (2012), 
http://victimsofcrime.org/docs/nat-conf-2013/handout-2.pdf?sfvrsn=2 [https://perma.cc/U5 
EQ-425P]; VIDYA SRI & DARAKSHAN RAJA, VOICES FROM THE FRONTLINE: ADDRESSING 
FORCED MARRIAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2013), http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/ 
carrcenter/files/vidyasri_voicesfromthefrontline.pdf?m=1406738934 [https://perma.cc/JH73-
X22E]. 
4  See, e.g., Associated Press, States Make New Push to Curb Child Marriage, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 20, 2016), https://nyti.ms/1mOVKm0 [https://perma.cc/ULW8-QXPQ]; Heather Barr, 
A Key Step Toward Ending Child Marriage in New York: Governor’s Support of Proposed 
Law Boosts Chances of Success, HUM. RTS. WATCH, (Mar. 1, 2017, 12:59 PM), 
https://www.hrw.org/print/300729 [https://perma.cc/9WW6-FQHY]; Lisa W. Foderaro, It’s 
Legal for 14-Year-Olds to Marry. Should It Be?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2017), 
https://nyti.ms/2neZOBe [https://perma.cc/2NHU-DS9C] (describing a case of a fifteen-
year-old forced to marry a twenty-one-year-old cousin); Eleanor Goldberg, New York’s 
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ists on the extent of the problem in the U.S., but a growing record of quantita-
tive studies and anecdotal accounts indicate that forced marriage is a wide-
spread concern.5 Advocates, individuals subjected to forced and child marriage, 
and concerned youth have increased their collective lobbying efforts and 
spurred state legislatures to address the problem. Since 2016, twelve states have 
considered legislation to further restrict the civil marriage of minors and four 
have adopted reforms.6 Although tightening marriage laws has strong symbolic 
value and may be an effective remedy for some, civil marriage reform does not 
redress the plight of girls like Sara Tasneem, who are forced into marriages in 
circumstances that evade state attention. The issuance and denial of marriage 
licenses constitutes the state’s primary tool to enforce civil limitations on mar-
                                                                                                                                 
Child Marriage ‘Ban’ Still Doesn’t Protect Girls, HUFFINGTON POST (June 21, 2017, 9:01 
AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/new-york-finally-banned-child-marriage_us_59 
49738ee4b0e84975504d42 [https://perma.cc/89FT-JLPQ] (criticizing the N.Y. legislation, 
saying that it does not go far enough to protect girls from forced marriages); Anna Grone-
wold, Advocates Demand New York Lawmakers Outlaw Child Marriage, SEATTLE TIMES 
(Feb. 14, 2017, 7:50 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/advocates-demand-
new-york-lawmakers-outlaw-child-marriage/ [https://perma.cc/2XUX-KUG8]; Shanika 
Gunaratna, The “Ugly” Reality of Child Marriage in the U.S., CBS NEWS (May 5, 2017, 
3:47 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/child-marriage-in-the-u-s-surprisingly-widespr 
ead/ [https://perma.cc/NU9A-9JM7] (highlighting the legality of child marriage in most 
states); Nicholas Kristof, 11 Years Old, a Mom, and Pushed to Marry Her Rapist in Florida, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2r51YnQ [https://perma.cc/878A-T6RN]; Fraidy 
Reiss, Why Can 12-Year-Olds Still Get Married in the United States?, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/02/10/why-does-the-uni 
ted-states-still-let-12-year-old-girls-get-married/?utm_term=.6d4ca4fce462 [https://perma.c 
c/9G23-BMNH]; Anjali Shastry, Va., Md. Weigh Raising Marriage Age to 18 to Combat 
Coercion, Abuse, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/ 
2016/feb/15/virginia-maryland-weigh-raising-marriage-age-to-18/ [https://perma.cc/RQ7Q-
CRGR] (discussing states who have legislation to raise marriage age minimums on the 
books); Alison Thoet, New Jersey Lawmakers Pass Bill Banning Child Marriage, PBS 
NEWSHOUR (Mar, 14, 2017, 3:58 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/new-jersey-
just-became-first-state-completely-ban-child-marriage/ [https://perma.cc/YAC4-L38B] (dis-
cussing New Jersey’s law raising the age requirement of marriage to 18); Anjali Tsui, In 
Fight over Child Marriage Laws, States Resist Calls for a Total Ban, PBS FRONTLINE (July 
6, 2017), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/in-fight-over-child-marriage-laws-states-
resist-calls-for-a-total-ban/ [https://perma.cc/M4TM-UF6E] (discussing different approaches 
to child marriage legislation); Debra Cassens Weiss, US Laws Have Allowed Children as 
Young as 12 to Get Married, A.B.A J. (Feb. 14, 2017, 7:00 AM), http://www.abajour 
nal.com/news/article/us_laws_have_allowed_children_as_young_as_12_to_get_married [ht 
tps://perma.cc/M2FA-5KE2] (pointing out that the laws allow for 12-year-olds to marry); 
Whiting, supra note 1. 
5  See infra Part I. 
6  See infra Section I.G. Although the nominal age of marriage is eighteen in most states, 
numerous exceptions permit minors to marry with parental consent or judicial approval un-
der certain circumstances. Understanding State Statutes on Minimum Marriage Age and Ex-
ceptions, TAHIRIH JUST. CTR., 1 (2016), https://www.tahirih.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/ 
11/FINAL-State-Marriage-Age-Requirements-Statutory-Compilation-PDF.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/JLG6-E528]. 
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riage before marriages occur. Yet, although marriage licenses are required or at 
least useful in many states to ensure that spouses have access to the legal rights 
and protections conferred upon married couples, marriage licenses are not re-
quired for religious or customary marriage ceremonies to take place, nor for 
marriages ceremonies to occur abroad. Armed with advanced knowledge of her 
impending religious marriage ceremony, Sara needed access to legal relief to 
prevent her father from orchestrating her marriage and removal from the coun-
try. To pursue such relief, Sara would have needed to know that a remedy ex-
isted and that she could qualify, and, especially given her age and maturity, she 
would have needed to know where to turn for help. 
No civil legal remedies designed to prevent or intervene in a forced mar-
riage currently exist in the United States.7 Most community-based organiza-
tions lack programs and services relating to forced marriage, and may not know 
how to respond if approached for help.8 These gaps in services and the law 
leave girls like Sara at the mercy of those determined to force them into mar-
riages. 
Civil protection orders have emerged as the central legal remedy in the 
United States to address a number of forms of gender-based violence, including 
domestic and dating abuse, sexual assault, and stalking.9 As forced marriage 
continues to emerge as another form of violence against women and girls,10 the 
time is ripe to evaluate the viability of civil protection orders to combat forced 
                                                        
7  See, e.g., Julia Alanen, Custom or Crime?: Part III of IV: Crafting a Competent Frame-
work to Combat Forced Marriage, 30 AM. J. FAM. L. 121, 121 (2016); ANGELA VIGIL, 
A.B.A. COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF 
DELEGATES 5 (2014) [hereinafter VIGIL, REPORT TO THE HOUSE]. 
8  HEATHER HEIMAN & JEANNE SMOOT, TAHIRIH JUST. CTR., FORCED MARRIAGE IN 
IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011 NATIONAL SURVEY RESULTS 5 
(2011). 
9  See infra Section II.A. 
10  Although forced marriage is recognized as a form of violence rooted in gender inequality 
and predominantly inflicted upon women and girls, it is important to note that men also ex-
perience this problem. In the United Kingdom, requests for assistance from male victims 
comprised 20 percent of the government’s Forced Marriage Unit caseload in 2016, 20 per-
cent in 2015, and 21 percent in 2014. FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, FORCED 
MARRIAGE UNIT STATISTICS 2016, at 3 (2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/sys 
tem/uploads/attachment_data/file/597869/Forced_Marriage_Unit_statistics-_2016.pdf [ht 
tps://perma.cc/78S3-MMBS] [hereinafter UK Statistics 2016]; FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH 
OFFICE, FORCED MARRIAGE UNIT STATISTICS 2015, at 3 (2016), https://www.gov.uk/gov 
ernment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/505827/Forced_Marriage_Unit_stat 
istics_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/6E8K-R2FR]; FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, 
FORCED MARRIAGE UNIT STATISTICS JANUARY TO DECEMBER 2014, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/412667/FMU
_Stats_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/93AJ-Q5VK]; see also EDWIGE RUDE-ANTOINE, COUNCIL 
OF EUR: DIRECTORATE GEN. OF HUM. RTS., FORCED MARRIAGES IN COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
MEMBER STATES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGISLATION AND POLITICAL INITIATIVES 23 
(2005), http://eige.europa.eu/resources/CDEG(2005)1_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/F972-ERVL] 
(describing male victims of forced marriage in France). 
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marriage.11 This Article undertakes a detailed analysis of the efficacy of civil 
protection orders in this context, and offers a preventive solution to the growing 
problem of forced marriage. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explores the problem of forced 
marriage in the United States, including its causes and consequences, as well as 
recent state legislative responses and possible channels for legal intervention. 
This analysis identifies civil protection orders as the existing legal remedy with 
the most promise to prevent forced marriages. Part II evaluates in detail the vi-
ability of civil protection orders to prevent and intervene in forced marriages. 
This Part identifies four features of protection order statutes that determine 
their utility in the forced marriage context: the designations of qualifying rela-
tionships and qualifying conduct, the treatment of minor petitioners, and the 
range of remedies that courts may include in approved orders. Part II concludes 
that under certain circumstances, civil protection orders could be effective at 
combatting forced marriages in many states. Yet, protection order statutes are 
an imperfect fit for forced marriage, and would exclude many at-risk individu-
als from relief. Consequently, Part III proposes that states adopt a new injunc-
tive remedy specifically crafted to address forced marriage—forced marriage 
protection orders. Modeled from the remedy adopted in the United Kingdom, 
forced marriage protection orders would center the court’s inquiry on whether a 
petitioner was facing or had experienced a forced marriage, and would empow-
er courts to tailor remedies to the needs of each petitioner. By moving away 
from a criminal paradigm, adopting a proactive orientation, incorporating a pe-
titioner-centered perspective, and explicitly extending the remedy to minors, 
forced marriage protection orders also would represent a new evolution in civil 
injunctive relief that could redress many critiques raised of civil protection or-
ders, and provide a model for reform of those laws. Finally, Part III recognizes 
and responds to potential concerns with the feasibility, enforceability, and de-
sirability of creating forced marriage protection orders. I conclude that the po-
tential benefits of targeted relief outweigh the potential drawbacks of failing to 
restrain forced marriage. 
I. FORCED MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. Definitions 
The right to choose the timing of one’s marriage and the identity of one’s 
spouse is widely recognized as a universal human right.12 The United States 
                                                        
11  Elizabeth M. Landau, Custom or Crime?: Part II of IV: Legal Remedies for Forced Mar-
riage Victims and Survivors, 30 AM. J. FAM. L. 46, 50 (2016) (suggesting protection orders 
as a possible remedy); Julia Alanen, Shattering the Silence Surrounding Forced and Early 
Marriage in the United States, 32 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 1, 12 (2012) (same). 
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Supreme Court has firmly established marriage as a fundamental constitutional 
right and a protected relationship, and has held that personal decisions relating 
to marriage are protected by the due process clause.13 As marriage is at its es-
sence a contract,14 consent is central to a marriage’s legal validity.15 
Forced marriages lack “the full and free consent of one or both parties and 
typically [involve] force, fraud, or coercion.”16 Forced marriage is a problem in 
its own right, and it overlaps with other exertions of power and control within 
personal and family relationships. Forced marriage has been recognized as a 
                                                                                                                                 
12  See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: General Recommenda-
tion No. 21 (1994), http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recom 
m.htm#recom19 [https://perma.cc/5CX8-2QJV] [hereinafter Recommendation 21] (“A 
woman’s right to choose a spouse and enter freely into marriage is central to her life and to 
her dignity and equality as a human being.”); G.A. Res. 34/180, Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, art. 16(1) (Dec. 18, 1979) (“State Par-
ties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all mat-
ters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of 
equality of men and women: . . . The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into 
marriage only with their free and full consent. . . .”); G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 10(1) (Dec. 16, 1966) (“Marriage 
must be entered into with the free consent of the intending spouses.”); G.A. Res. 2200A 
(XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 23(3) (Dec. 16, 1966) (“No 
marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses.”); 
G.A. Res. 217A (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 16(2) (Dec. 10, 1948) 
(“Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spous-
es.”). 
13  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2534, 2599 (2015) (holding that the Court has long held 
the right to marry is in the due process clause, in part, because, “the right to personal choice 
regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy”); Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (marriage is “one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness by free men”); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) 
(relying on Loving to hold that a requirement that fathers with outstanding child support ob-
ligations must secure judicial permission to remarry unconstitutionally infringed on the fun-
damental right to marry). See generally SANFORD N. KATZ, FAMILY LAW IN AMERICA 32–35 
(2d ed. 2015) (summarizing U.S. Supreme Court precedent establishing marriage as a fun-
damental right); Natalie Nanasi, An “I Do” I Choose: How the Fight for Marriage Access 
Supports a Per Se Finding of Persecution for Asylum Cases Based on Forced Marriage, 28 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 48, 74–80 (2014) (same). 
14  KATZ, supra note 13, at 29–31. 
15  Id. at 37–40; Nanasi, supra note 13, at 73–74. 
16  Casey Swegman, The Intersectionality of Forced Marriage with Other Forms of Abuse in 
the United States, VAWNET.ORG 1 (2016) http://www.tahirih.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/AR_ForcedMarriage.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JP9-EPDE]; see also 
FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, FORCED MARRIAGE: A WRONG NOT A RIGHT ch. 1 
(2005), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20080305143653/http://www.fco.gov.uk/ 
Files/kfile/forcedmarriageconsultation%20doc.pdf [http://perma.cc/JLR9-UGU3] [hereinaf-
ter A WRONG NOT A RIGHT]; HEIMAN & SMOOT, supra note 8, at 2; see also sources cited su-
pra note 12. 
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form of domestic abuse, a form of honor violence, and a violation of human 
rights.17 
Forced marriages differ from arranged marriages, which remain “a long-
standing tradition in many cultures and countries.”18 “In arranged marriages, 
the families of both spouses take a leading role in arranging the marriage but 
the choice whether to accept the arrangement remains with the individual.”19 
Forced marriages also differ from child or “early” marriages, in which one or 
both spouses is a minor.20 
The presence or absence of consent distinguishes arranged from forced 
marriages, and forced from child marriages. But the boundaries between these 
different marriage categories sometimes blur.21 Because consent is personal to 
the individual and individuals may be unclear about their feelings, it can be dif-
ficult for those on the outside to identify a marriage as forced. 
As another example of overlap between these marriage categories, spousal 
age is a central concern in forced marriage prevention efforts. Forced marriage 
concerns relating to spousal age include that: a significant number of forced 
                                                        
17  See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., U.N. Comm. on the Elimination 
of Discrimination against Women, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation Against Women: General Recommendation No. 19, Comment Articles 2(f), 5 and 
10(c) (1992), http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.ht 
m#recom19 [https://perma.cc/5CX8-2QJV] (“Traditional attitudes by which women are re-
garded as subordinate to men or as having stereotyped roles perpetuate widespread practices 
involving violence or coercion, such as . . . forced marriage. . . . Such prejudices and practic-
es may justify gender-based violence as a form of protection or control of women. The effect 
of such violence on the physical and mental integrity of women is to deprive them the equal 
enjoyment, exercise and knowledge of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”). The U.S. 
State Department recognizes forced marriage as “a violation of basic human rights,” and “a 
form of child abuse,” when a minor is involved. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 7 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
MANUAL (FAM): FORCED MARRIAGE OF MINORS 1741(a) (2005), https://fam.state.gov/FAM/ 
07FAM/07FAM1740.html [https://perma.cc/J369-2BVC] [hereinafter FAM]. 
18  FAM, supra note 17, at 1743. 
19  Id.; see also A WRONG NOT A RIGHT, supra note 16. 
20  Children are permitted to marry under limited circumstances in all fifty states. Research of 
state marriage data indicates that at least 207,468 minors married in the United States be-
tween 2000 and 2015. Anjali Tsui et al., Child Marriage in America: By the Numbers, PBS 
FRONTLINE (July 6, 2017), http://apps.frontline.org/child-marriage-by-the-numbers/ [http:// 
perma.cc/MH36-TD5S]. This number likely underreports the problem, as it includes data 
from only forty-one states and that data includes gaps in years and counties reporting in 
some states. Id. “Advocates in the United States differ with respect to whether child marriage 
can be directly equated with forced marriage.” Swegman, supra note 16, at 3. 
21  Julia Alanen, Custom or Crime? (Part I of IV): Catalysts and Consequences of Forced 
Marriage, 29 AM. J. FAM. L. 227, 227 (2016); see also Shamita Das Dasgupta, Foreword to 
VIDYA SRI & DARAKSHAN RAJA, VOICES FROM THE FRONTLINE: ADDRESSING FORCED 
MARRIAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2013) (“arranged and forced marriages may be 
viewed as points on a continuum of ‘persuasion’ that stretches between two extremes: mild 
request and severe abuse.”). 
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marriage victims are minors;22 a minor may not be psychologically prepared to 
make major life decisions;23 the social norms and legal structures that place mi-
nors under parental control make them especially vulnerable to forced marriag-
es promoted by their parents or guardians;24 and child brides face an increased 
risk of abuse within marriage25 and health risks from early pregnancies.26 Final-
ly, minors who are forced to marry often marry adults, which may increase 
their vulnerability in the marriage,27 and make them legally unable to consent to 
sex under statutory rape laws.28 On the other hand, concerns about preserving 
the autonomy of older minors, and the recognition that minors may have legit-
imate reasons to marry before they reach eighteen years of age, have contribut-
ed to a robust debate within the United States as to whether and under what cir-
cumstances minors should be deemed capable to consent to marry.29 Although 
concerns particular to minors often are raised in forced marriage literature, the 
problem of forced marriage is not limited to children. The U.S. Department of 
                                                        
22  Bangura et al., supra note 3, at 1; HEIMAN & SMOOT, supra note 8, at 2; Swegman, supra 
note 16, at 3. 
23  U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
Joint General Recommendation No. 31 of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimina-
tion Against Women/General Comment No. 18 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
on Harmful Practices, at 7, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18 (Nov. 14, 2014) 
[hereinafter Recommendation 31]. 
24  See generally 1 DONALD T. KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN at v–vi (rev. 2d ed. 
2005). 
25  Judith McFarlane et al., Child Brides, Forced Marriage, and Partner Violence in Ameri-
ca: Tip of an Iceberg Revealed, 127 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 706, 706 (2016); 
Swegman, supra note 16, at 3. 
26  Recommendation 31, supra note 23, at 7, 22. 
27  Tsui et al., supra note 20 (86 percent of minors married between 2000–2015 married 
adults). 
28  See infra note 209 and accompanying text. 
29  The United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, for example, considers all 
child marriages to be forced because children under eighteen are incapable of giving a valid 
consent to marriage. Cheryl Thomas, Forced and Early Marriage: A Focus on Central and 
Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union Countries with Selected Laws from Other Coun-
tries, U.N. Doc. EGM/GPLHP/2009/EP.08. Many international human rights instruments 
and recommendations from human rights bodies promote eighteen as the appropriate mini-
mum age to marry for boys and girls. See, e.g., Recommendation 21, supra note 12 (“the 
Committee considers that the minimum age for marriage should be 18 years for both man 
and woman. When men and women marry, they assume important responsibilities. Conse-
quently, marriage should not be permitted before they have attained full maturity and capaci-
ty to act.”). On the other hand, organizations including the ACLU and the Women’s Law 
Center of Maryland have argued that total bans on marriage before eighteen undermine the 
autonomy of older minors and infringe upon the fundamental right to marry. Tsui et. al., su-
pra note 4. Other groups have objected that marriage provides one of only a few viable paths 
to emancipation and exit from the foster care system, and that minors may want their chil-
dren to be born to married parents. Id. 
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State has recognized that those most at risk of forced marriages fall between the 
ages of thirteen and thirty.30 
Free and full consent to marriage not only requires that an individual ap-
proves of the idea of marriage, its timing, and the intended partner; but also that 
the individual can reject a proposed marriage without facing significant nega-
tive repercussions.31 Forced marriages include any marriage that one party is 
unable to end or leave, even if the marriage was initially entered consensually.32 
B. The Scope of the Problem 
Forced marriages take many forms. They include civil marriages recog-
nized under state and federal laws, marriages sanctified by religious or custom-
ary/traditional authorities, informal cohabitation recognized as a marriage by 
the family and community, or some combination of the three.33 Forced mar-
riages can involve U.S. citizens or immigrants, and take place both within the 
United States and abroad, after a victim is tricked or coerced into traveling to 
her family’s home country.34 
National data on the prevalence of forced marriage is nonexistent in the 
United States.35 The little information that does exist stems from surveys of 
community-based service providers and localized surveys of individuals from 
particular communities or settings.36 Although much remains unknown about 
the issue, anecdotal findings in three distinct contexts suggest a broader prob-
lem.37 
First, forced marriage is an identifiable issue facing clients of community-
based organizations throughout the United States. A voluntary survey of organ-
izations in forty-seven states identified as many as 3,000 forced marriage cases 
                                                        
30  FAM, supra note 17. 
31  Swegman, supra note 16, at 2. 
32  U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Preventing and Eliminating Child, Early and 
Forced Marriage, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/22 (Apr. 2, 2014) (“A forced marriage is any 
marriage which occurs without the full and free consent of one or both of the parties and/or 
where one or both of the parties is/are unable to end or leave the marriage, including as a 
result of duress or intense social or family pressure.”). 
33  Bangura et al., supra note 3, at 4. Customary or traditional marriages are conducted ac-
cording to the laws or beliefs of a cultural group that may or may not have a basis in religion. 
Id. at Terminology. 
34  FAM, supra note 17, at 1743.1–.3; HEIMAN & SMOOT, supra note 8, at 8; McFarlane et al., 
supra note 25, at 708–09. 
35  CYNTHIA HELBA ET AL., REPORT ON EXPLORATORY STUDY INTO HONOR VIOLENCE 
MEASUREMENT METHODS 3-3 (2014); SRI & RAJA, supra note 3, at 8. There are many chal-
lenges to collecting valid quantitative data on forced marriage, including the many forms of 
unregistered and informal marriages. Thus, many countries must rely on anecdotal data and 
small-scale studies to understand the problem. See, e.g., RUDE-ANTOINE, supra note 10, at 
22. 
36  HELBA ET AL., supra note 35, at 7-3. 
37  HEIMAN & SMOOT, supra note 8, at 3. 
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over a two-year period.38 This number is particularly striking because the vast 
majority of respondents reported that their agency neither screened for, nor of-
fered assistance related to, forced marriage at the time.39 The survey identified 
reports of forced marriage involving women originating from fifty-six different 
countries and, although it focused on immigrant women, also produced reports 
of forced marriage within non-immigrant American families.40 
Second, women receiving services for domestic abuse report experience 
with forced marriage in significant numbers. In a 2016 study of mothers sub-
jected to intimate partner violence, 17 percent of the 277 participants reported 
having been forced to marry or subjected to a forced marriage attempt.41 At the 
time of these reported incidents, nearly half of the participants were under the 
age of eighteen, most were U.S. citizens, and the vast majority were in the 
United States.42 Most neither sought nor received assistance.43 When they did 
reach out for help, most confided in friends or family members; few turned to 
formal sources of support.44 
Third, the pressure for girls to marry is pervasive within some communi-
ties. In one study, twenty-eight out of thirty young female clients of an organi-
zation serving West African immigrants had been pressured to marry or were 
married before they reached eighteen years of age.45 In another study, students 
of Middle Eastern, North African, and South Asian descent at the City Univer-
sity of New York revealed frequent anxiety and family tension regarding mar-
riage.46 Forced marriage practices also have been documented within several 
non-immigrant conservative religious groups.47 
                                                        
38  Id. at 7. Of the more than 500 agencies that responded to the survey, 41 percent reported 
at least one known or suspected case of forced marriage during 2009–2011. Id. 
39  Id. at 5–6. Half of the survey respondents reported that forced marriages usually or always 
occurred before the victim was connected to the agency. Id. at 7. Only 22 percent of re-
spondents reported having screening processes that would enable them to identify forced 
marriage concerns. Id. at 5. Less than 16 percent reported that their agency would be able to 
assist individuals facing forced marriage if cases were identified. Id. at 6. 
40  Id. at 7. The countries most frequently identified included India, Pakistan, Mexico, Bang-
ladesh, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen. Id. Respondents also identified 
“over a dozen countries in Africa, numerous countries in Asia and the Middle East, and se-
lect countries in Europe and the Americas.” Id. 
41  McFarlane et al., supra note 25, at 708. All of the study participants qualified for domes-
tic violence shelter or a civil protection order. Id. at 707. 
42  Id. at 708–09 (noting that 45 percent reported the forced marriage or attempt occurring 
when they were under eighteen; 74 percent were U.S. citizens; 85 percent reported that the 
forced marriage or attempt occurred in the United States). 
43  Id. at 708. 
44  Id. at 710. 
45  Bangura et al., supra note 3, at 9. Only six of the girls “outwardly resisted” early marriage 
and two fully consented. Id. 
46  See generally ANTHONY MARCUS ET AL., IS FORCED MARRIAGE A PROBLEM IN THE UNITED 
STATES? 2, http://www.theahafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/AHA_Forced-
Marriage-Report.pdf. [https://perma.cc/82GH-HQ49] (last visited May. 8, 2018). See also 
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C. Causes 
Forced marriage is driven by a number of factors.48 Three common motiva-
tors in the United States include pregnancy, honor, and tradition. Pregnancy 
contributes to forced marriages because of social views that sex, pregnancy, 
and childbirth should occur exclusively within marriage. As one example, 
Keith Strawn drove his fourteen-year-old daughter from Idaho to Missouri to 
take advantage of a Missouri law permitting younger minors to marry.49 In 
Missouri, Strawn forced his daughter to marry her twenty-four-year-old rapist 
because she was pregnant, and Strawn believed that men must marry the wom-
en they impregnate.50 Although his actions were extreme and horrifying, 
Strawn’s worldview is no outlier in the United States. The continued recogni-
tion of the “shotgun wedding” within American popular culture points to long-
standing beliefs and social pressures within some communities that a pregnancy 
must result in a wedding.51 The prevalence of pregnancy exceptions to mini-
mum marriage age laws reflect the view that sex and pregnancy should occur 
within marriage, set up marriage as a solution to teen pregnancy, and convey 
                                                                                                                                 
UK Statistics 2016, supra note 10, at 9 (identifying Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Somalia, 
and Afghanistan as the countries related to the highest number of forced marriage reports; 
Pakistan had the largest share by far with 43 percent of reports, followed by Bangladesh with 
8 percent). 
47  Esther’s Story, UNCHAINED AT LAST, http://www.unchainedatlast.org/about-arranged-
forced-marriage/esthers-story/ [https://perma.cc/FZF9-8JK9] (last visited May. 8, 2018) (de-
scribing a forced marriage in a Hassidic community); Kristof, supra note 4 (including stories 
about forced marriage in a Pentecostal church, a conservative Christian household, and an 
ultra-Orthodox Jewish family). 
48  HEIMAN & SMOOT, supra note 8, at 8; Bangura et al., supra note 3, at 9; Swegman, supra 
note 16, at 1. 
49  E. Idaho Father Arranged Marriage of his Daughter, 14, to Man Who Got Her Pregnant, 
IDAHO ST. J. (May 31, 2016), http://idahostatejournal.com/members/e-idaho-father-arranged-
marriage-of-his-daughter-to-man/article_55a4c32f-605e-5081-a12e-561151a58887.html [ht 
tps://perma.cc/5XJQ-KFPY]. 
50  Id. 
51  See, e.g., DIXIE CHICKS, White Trash Wedding, on HOME (Open Wide/ Monument/ Co-
lumbia Records 2002) (“Baby’s on its way. Say I do and kiss me quick because baby’s on its 
way”); KEVIN FOWLER, Knocked Up, on CHIPPIN’ AWAY (Average Joe’s 2011) (“Yeah, your 
family’s got the shotgun ready . . . I can hear those church bells chime . . . No, I may not be 
ready for a wedding, honey . . . But I know that I ain’t ready to die”); RELIENT K, Deathbed, 
on FIVE SCORE AND SEVEN YEARS AGO (Capitol Records 2007) (“Got married on my twenty-
first. Eight months before my wife would give birth. It’s easier to be sure you love someone 
. . . When her father inquires with the barrel of a gun”); see also NICHOLAS L. SYRETT, 
AMERICAN CHILD BRIDE: A HISTORY OF MINORS AND MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 234–
36 (2016) (identifying pregnancy as a cause of the rise of teen marriages following World 
War II, and noting that “[m]any girls, and especially those who dated young boys, were 
‘forced’ into marriage on discovering that they were pregnant”). Men are often those forced 
into “shotgun” marriages. Although no reliable statistics on the number of men forced into 
marriages exist in the United States, data from the United Kingdom and France indicate that 
men consistently seek assistance (although in considerably smaller numbers than women). 
See FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, supra note 10. 
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state support for children being born into marriages.52 Teenage pregnancies in 
particular may lead to forced marriages, because families retain more control 
over the bride-to-be.53 Notably, the American South and Southwest have the 
highest teen pregnancy rates in the country, and also the highest rates of teen 
marriages.54 
In some cases, marriages may be forced to halt criminal rape or statutory 
rape investigations. At age eleven, Sherry Johnson was forced to marry a twen-
ty-year-old man, one of two members of her church who had raped her, after 
child welfare officials began investigating the circumstances of her pregnan-
cy.55 Ms. Johnson’s mother and church leaders forced her to marry her attacker 
to protect him from criminal prosecution.56  
Two additional motivators for forced marriage, which often intertwine, are 
adherence to tradition and preservation of family honor.57 In certain immigrant 
and nonimmigrant communities in the United States, it is customary for women 
to marry at a young age.58 Once young women reach puberty, families may take 
steps to remove them from corrupting influences and preserve their reputations 
in advance of marriage, such as withdrawing them from school or restricting 
their contact with non-family members.59 Families may suddenly make or ac-
celerate marriage plans if a daughter is believed to be socializing with boys, da-
ting, engaging in sexual activity, or is viewed as becoming “too American-
                                                        
52  SYRETT, supra note 51, at 260–61. 
53  People v. Dozier, 424 N.Y.S.2d 1010, 1014 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (“The state has a legit-
imate concern that females sixteen years and younger do not become pregnant or suffer 
physical injury, and as a result, find themselves facing practical problems for which their 
youth has not prepared them. Forced marriage, unwed motherhood, adoption, abortion, the 
need for medical treatment and precipitate withdrawal from school are just some of the con-
siderations which often have to be faced. . . .”); In re Comm’r of Soc. Servs. ex rel Leslie C., 
614 N.Y.S.2d 855, 860 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1994) (“[T]here are sound social policy reasons un-
derlying the public policy of discouraging sexual intercourse among unwed females under 
the age of seventeen. Certain consequences, such as . . . forced marriage . . . must invariably 
be faced when children bear children.”). 
54  SYRETT, supra note 51, at 264–65. 
55  Kristof, supra note 4. 
56  Id. 
57  HEIMAN & SMOOT, supra note 8, at 8. 
58  See, e.g., Bangura et al., supra note 3, at 9; Case Swegman, Forced Child Marriage Case 
Scenarios for Lisa Martin (July 12, 2017) (case examples from a Christian non-immigrant 
religious community and a Pakistani immigrant community). 
59  Swegman, Forced Child Marriage Case Scenarios for Lisa Martin, supra note 58 (“Sa-
rah,” and “Halimah”); Yasmine Koenig as told to Liz Welch, My Mom Took Me Overseas 
and Forced Me into Being a Teen Bride, SEVENTEEN (Oct. 13, 2017), http://www.seventeen.c 
om/life/real-girl-stories/a40668/parents-sent-me-to-the-middle-east-to-get-married/ 
[https://perma.cc/FAX8-CHBE] (describing how a mother removed daughter from school 
after eighth grade and took her to Palestine to marry at fifteen after she was discovered to 
have a boyfriend, and separately forced an older sister to marry after discovering a diary en-
try about kissing a boy). 
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ized.”60 In some communities, a young woman’s disobedience to any direction 
from the male head of the family, including a dictate to marry, is considered 
dishonor to her family.61 To “restore” the family’s honor in the wake of disobe-
dience, the woman may be severely punished, disowned, or even killed.62 
Young women might submit to marriages they do not wish to enter, or remain 
in marriages they otherwise would leave, out of fear that their decisions may 
provoke retributory violence from family members against themselves or oth-
ers.63 Other common motivators behind forced marriages include parents’ be-
liefs that a marriage serves a child’s best interests; obligations to honor con-
tracts or arrangements between families; and the desire to secure economic or 
immigration benefits to families or the intended spouse.64 
D. Tactics 
Individuals facing forced marriage often experience coordinated pressure 
from parents, relatives, friends, and community members.65 Common tactics 
include: parents threatening to harm or kill themselves; declaring the ruin of a 
family’s or individual’s reputation; isolation;66 social ostracization;67 threats to 
kick an individual out of the house or withdraw financial support;68 taking or 
threatening to take a child out of school;69 or threats of physical violence 
against the individual or others they care about.70 In more extreme cases, tactics 
have included physical violence or torture,71 threats of deportation, taking the 
individual abroad through deception, kidnapping, captivity, stalking, consecrat-
                                                        
60  HEIMAN & SMOOT, supra note 8, at 8. 
61  HELBA ET AL., supra note 35, at 1-2–1-3. 
62  Id. at 1-4, 2-5–2-6, 3-2–3-3. 
63  See Court Upholds Man’s Sentencing in ‘Honor Killing,’ CBS ATL. (Jan. 22, 2013, 9:05 
AM), http://atlanta.cbslocal.com/2013/01/22/court-upholds-mans-sentence-in-honor-killing/ 
[https://perma.cc/ 3UWD-76TN] [hereinafter CBS ATL., Honor Killing]; Dad Charged with 
Murdering Reluctant Bride, CNN (July 9, 2008), http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/07/08/ 
honor.killing/#cnnSTCText [https://perma.cc/WH5A-NZSW] [hereinafter CNN, Reluctant 
Bride]; see also Mosi Secret, Court Documents Detail a Deadly Family Feud from Brooklyn 
to Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2013, at A26 (describing how an American citizen was 
forced into a marriage in Pakistan, then threatened with murder when she escaped, and those 
who helped her escape were killed). 
64  HEIMAN & SMOOT, supra note 8, at 8. 
65  Bangura et al., supra note 3, at 9. 
66  McFarlane et al., supra note 25, at 708–09; Debjani Roy, An Introduction to Forced Mar-
riage in the South Asian Community in the United States, MANAVI OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 9, 
at 22 (2011), https://web.archive.org/web/20160810073656/http://www.manavi.org/docu 
ments/Manavi_paper9_pass-6.26.12.pdf [https://perma.cc/DY22-YR44]. 
67  McFarlane et al., supra note 25, at 708–09. 
68  Id. 
69  Roy, supra note 66, at 23. 
70  HEIMAN & SMOOT, supra note 8, at 8; McFarlane et al., supra note 25, at 708–09. 
71  Roy, supra note 66, at 23; McFarlane et al., supra note 25, at 708–09. 
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ing a marriage without the individual’s knowledge or participation, withholding 
food or medical care, and even threats of murder.72 
Potential forced marriage victims may know or suspect that a marriage is 
being planned, or they may be taken completely by surprise. Thirteen-year-old 
Jesse Bender fled her home in California with the support of an uncle because 
she feared she would be forced into a marriage during an impending family trip 
to Pakistan.73 Kay Gans’s parents told her they were taking her and her boy-
friend to a football game when they drove them to West Virginia from Ohio.74 
Instead, they took Kay and her boyfriend to a county clerk’s office, directed 
Kay to tell the clerk she was seventeen years old, consented to her marriage to 
her seventeen-year-old boyfriend, and saw the couple married before driving 
them back to Ohio.75 
E. Consequences 
Those facing forced marriage experience numerous harms. In contempo-
rary U.S. society, where divorce is a commonplace and relatively accessible 
remedy, the harm created by the solemnization of a marriage may be difficult to 
understand. But forced marriages cause real and significant harm to those sub-
jected to them, whatever the tactics involved. “Forced marriage is [a] form of 
violence against women in its own right, even when sexual violence and other 
forms of harm and abuse are not present.”76 Forced marriage deprives a non-
consenting spouse of dignity, autonomy, and self-determination.77 Denying an 
individual the opportunity to choose her own life partner, and thereby the direc-
tion and circumstances of her life, communicates that her own needs or desires 
are unworthy of respect and secondary to the designs for her life that others 
have created to advance their own interests. Those forced into marriage also 
face rape,78 domestic and family violence,79 stalking,80 and, in some cultures, 
                                                        
72  HEIMAN & SMOOT, supra note 8, at 8. A man in Georgia was convicted of murdering his 
daughter after she threatened to divorce the husband that she had been forced to marry 
against her will. The news reports described the marriage as “arranged,” but statements to 
the police by the victim’s father’s wife indicate that the marriage occurred without the vic-
tim’s consent. CNN, Reluctant Bride, supra note 63; CBS ATL., Honor Killing, supra note 
63; see also Secret, supra note 63 (describing how an American citizen was forced into a 
marriage in Pakistan, then threatened with murder when she escaped, and those who helped 
her escape were killed). 
73  Paloma Esquivel, Girl, 13, Says She Fled Home to Avoid a Forced Marriage in Pakistan, 
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/04/local/la-me-hesperia-girl-
20110304 [https://perma.cc/T7SA-XEPL]. 
74  State v. Gans, 151 N.E.2d 709, 709 (Ohio 1958). 
75  Id. at 714. 
76  Swegman, supra note 16, at 2; see also Recommendation 31, supra note 23. 
77  See Recommendation 21, supra note 12 (“A woman’s right to choose a spouse and enter 
freely into marriage is central to her life and to her dignity and equality as a human being.”). 
78  SRI & RAJA, supra note 3, at 14, 21; McFarlane et al., supra note 25, at 708–09. 
79  MARCUS ET AL., supra note 46, at 2; SRI & RAJA, supra note 3, at 24. 
18 NEV. L.J. 919, MARTIN - FINAL 5/30/18  2:08 PM 
934 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:919  
female genital cutting (FGC),81 both before and after a marriage occurs,82 all of 
which may lead to depression, suicide, or suicide attempts.83 Moreover, those 
forced into marriages who are cut off from friends and restricted in their 
movements may suffer isolation and lose opportunities for education and em-
ployment.84 
Multiple barriers prevent individuals from escaping forced marriages. 
Those forced into marriages may face reprisals from family members if they 
resist, abandon, or seek to dissolve their unions.85 Individuals who are taken 
abroad to marry may be left without a passport, means of communication, or 
access to finances.86 For example, Yasmine Koenig was only fifteen when her 
parents forced her to marry a twenty-four-year-old man during a family trip to 
Palestine. Yasmine’s parents did not tell her that they planned for her to marry 
before they left the United States; they told her that they were going to visit her 
sisters and other relatives.87 Yasmine escaped her marriage only because she 
had access to a cell phone. She contacted the U.S. Embassy, which arranged 
her transportation back to the United States after two months of furtive com-
munications.88 
F. Legal Responses 
The problems of child and forced marriage in the United States recently 
have garnered increasing attention from state legislatures. Between 2016 and 
the time of this article’s publication, at least eighteen states have considered 
bills that would reform civil marriage laws to reduce forced and child marriage 
by increasing the lawful marriage age, requiring judicial approval for marriages 
involving minors, or emancipating minors who are granted permission to marry 
to ensure they have the capacity to protect their own legal interests.89 At the 
                                                                                                                                 
80  Swegman, supra note 16, at 8. 
81  Id. at 9–10. 
82  Id. at 6. 
83  SRI & RAJA, supra note 3, at 15; HEIMAN & SMOOT, supra note 8, at 9. 
84  THE BRITISH ASS’N OF SOC. WORKERS, A CHOICE BY RIGHT: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING 
GROUP ON FORCED MARRIAGE 15 (2000) [hereinafter A CHOICE BY RIGHT]. 
85  HELBA ET AL., supra note 35, at 3-3; SRI & RAJA, supra note 3, at 20; Swegman, supra 
note 16, at 8. 
86  ELEANOR STOBART, FORCED MARRIAGE UNIT, MULTI-AGENCY PRACTICE GUIDELINES: 
HANDLING CASES OF FORCED MARRIAGE 14 (2009). 
87  Welch, supra note 59. 
88  Id. Upon her return to the United States, Yasmine was placed into the foster care system. 
She ultimately was adopted by her foster family. Id. 
89  S.B. 133, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2018); H.B. 2006, 53rd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 
2018); H.B. 71, 2018 Leg., 120th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2018); S.B. 140, 2018 Leg., 120th Reg. 
Sess. (Fla. 2018); S.B. 208, 2018 Leg., 120th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2018); S.B. 48, 2018 Gen. 
Asemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2018); H.B. 191, 438th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2018); S.B. 
670, 438th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2018); H.B. 1785, 110th Gen. Assemb., 2d. Reg. 
Sess. (Tenn. 2018); H.B. 2521, 110th Gen. Assemb., 2d. Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2018); H.B. 790, 
 
18 NEV. L.J. 919, MARTIN - FINAL 5/30/18  2:08 PM 
Spring 2018] RESTRAINING FORCED MARRIAGE 935 
time of publication, at least four states have succeeded—Connecticut, New 
York, Texas, and Virginia adopted marriage reforms in 2016 and 2017.90 Dela-
ware reformed its marriage law to require all minors to seek court approval to 
marry in 2007.91 
Separate from the recent push for marriage reform, nine states, the District 
of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands criminalize forced marriage.92 Al-
0though the operative statutes remain good law, they appear to have little prac-
tical utility. Several of the offenses are drafted in antiquated terms and are in-
cluded within statutes enacted to combat other problems, such as abduction, de-
filement, prostitution, and pandering.93 A few newer statutes address forced 
marriage in the context of human trafficking.94 Despite the fact that some of 
                                                                                                                                 
2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2018); S.B. 273, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017); 
H.B. 5442, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2017); H.B. 799, 437th Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (Md. 2017); S.B. 861, 437th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2017); H.B. 2310, 
190th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2017); H.B. 2311, 190th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 
2017); S.B. 785, 190th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2017); S.B. 786, 190th Gen. Ct., Reg. 
Sess. (Mass. 2017); H.B. 270, 99th Gen Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2017); H.B. 499, 
165th Gen. Ct., 1st year Reg Sess. (N.H. 2017); Assemb. B. 5524, 240th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(N.Y. 2017); S.B. 4407, 2017 N.Y. Sess. Laws, ch. 35 (2017); S.B. 198, 132nd Gen. As-
semb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017); H.B. 1038, 201st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2017); H.B. 
3932, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017); S.B. 1705, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017); As-
semb. B. 3091, 217th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2016); S.B. 2528, 217th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. 
(N.J. 2016); S.B. 415, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2016). 
90  H.B. 5442, 2017 Gen Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2017); Assemb. B. 5524, 240th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017); S.B. 4407, 2017 N.Y. Sess. Laws, ch. 35 (2017); H.B. 3932, 85th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017); S.B. 1705, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017); S.B. 415, 2016 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2016). 
91  The law eliminated a prior exception, which permitted pregnant minors to marry without 
court approval. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 123 (2017). A parent, guardian, or next friend 
must petition the court for approval of the marriage on behalf of the minor to be married. Id. 
For more information on the laws regarding marriage age in all fifty states, see Understand-
ing State Statutes on Minimum Marriage Age and Exceptions, supra note 6. 
92  CAL. PENAL CODE § 265 (West 2018); D.C. CODE § 22-2705 (2018); MD. CODE ANN., 
CRIM. LAW § 11-303 (West 2018); MINN. STAT. § 609.265 (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-
1 (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.300 (2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 1117–19 (2017); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 18.2-355 (2017); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 1301 (2017); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-
14 (2017); TAHIRIH JUSTICE CTR., CRIMINAL LAWS ADDRESSING FORCED MARRIAGE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 1 (2013) [hereinafter CRIMINAL LAWS]; Landau, supra note 11, at 47–49 (in-
cluding California, Florida, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, Oklahoma, Virginia, 
and West Virginia). 
93  Landau, supra note 11, at 47–49. 
94  CRIMINAL LAWS, supra note 92; Landau, supra note 11, at 47. The United Nations Inter-
national Labor Organization and International Organization for Migration recently co-
published a study recognizing forced marriage as one form of human trafficking/modern 
slavery. See INT’L LABOUR ORG. (ILO) ET AL., GLOBAL ESTIMATES OF MODERN SLAVERY: 
FORCED LABOUR AND FORCED MARRIAGE 9 (2017). 
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these statutes have existed for a century or more, researchers have been unable 
to identify a single prosecution for forced marriage under any of these laws.95 
G. Gaps in Legal Relief 
Existing marriage, criminal, child abuse and neglect, and tort laws have at 
least a theoretical potential to provide legal protection from forced marriage. In 
practice, none of these remedies is likely to provide material relief on a wide 
scale. For example, civil marriage laws can attempt to deter the forced marriage 
of minors by categorically limiting minors’ access to state-sanctioned marriage 
and increase state scrutiny of marriages involving minors through judicial re-
view. Although such laws may succeed in delaying or deterring the marriages 
of some minors, civil marriage laws do not prevent marriages from being con-
ducted without state sanction. Marriages conducted abroad, and marriages con-
ducted within the United States in religious or customary ceremonies are not 
subject to state regulation. State marriage law kicks in only once the couple 
seeks legal recognition by or a marriage-based benefit from the state. 
The criminal justice system is also unlikely to be able to respond effective-
ly to the problem on a wide scale for two primary reasons. First, individuals 
facing forced marriages are unlikely to cooperate. Those facing forced marriag-
es often report wanting to postpone or avoid marriage without severing ties to 
their families, communities, and culture.96 To prevent negative repercussions 
for family members, those facing forced marriages have declined outside assis-
tance if they believe it could result in prosecution, deportation, embarrassment, 
or separation from family members.97 
Second, even where victims want to cooperate, law enforcement officers’ 
reluctance to interfere in private family life or take a position on a “cultural” 
matter98 may preclude the investigation and prosecution of forced marriage 
                                                        
95  CRIMINAL LAWS, supra note 92; VIGIL, REPORT TO THE HOUSE, supra note 7, at 5. At least 
one state, Michigan, repealed a prior forced marriage criminal statute (former MICH. COMP. 
LAWS. § 750.11 (repealed 2010)) as part of an effort to repeal outdated criminal statutes that 
were not being enforced. Id. 
96  Bangura et al., supra note 3, at 2; STOBART, supra note 86, at 13. 
97  A WRONG NOT A RIGHT, supra note 16, at 2.1, 2.8 (reporting that in nearly all of the 250 
cases per year addressed by the Home Office Forced Marriage Unit and in all of the 165 
forced marriage cases reported to the Metropolitan police in the two years preceding the re-
port, the potential victim sought assurances that no prosecution would result before accept-
ing assistance). VIGIL, REPORT TO THE HOUSE, supra note 7, at 8; Bangura et al., supra note 
3, at 12. 
98  VIGIL, REPORT TO THE HOUSE, supra note 7, at 8. In the related context of female genital 
cutting, another form of violence perpetrated against young women and girls by family 
members, more than twenty years passed between the enactment of the federal law criminal-
izing the practice in 1996 and the first prosecution to enforce it. These first charges for fe-
male genital cutting were filed in April 2017 against a doctor, not parents or family members 
of the victim. Arlene Tchekmedyian, For the First Time in the U.S., a Doctor Is Charged 
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crimes.99 These factors limit the viability of prosecution as a remedy after a 
forced marriage or an attempt to force a marriage has occurred, and the absence 
of forced marriage prosecutions prevents the criminal justice system from de-
terring the practice.100 
Some may consider the child abuse and neglect system a preferable means 
of intervention for minors being forced into marriages by their parents. The 
system has been effective in preventing forced marriages in cases brought to its 
attention by experienced advocates.101 But, the abuse and neglect system may 
not be well-equipped to address the problem as a matter of course. In practice, 
child protection agencies may be unprepared to respond to forced marriage 
complaints, and may view the circumstances of a child’s marriage as a “cultural 
dispute” rather than a case of abuse or neglect requiring state intervention.102 
In some states, child protection orders provide a mechanism for individuals 
(rather than the state child welfare agency) to seek injunctive relief to protect a 
child.103 Petitions for child protection orders typically must be filed by desig-
nated adults on behalf of a child, and must allege that qualifying criminal con-
duct has occurred.104 Child protection orders typically offer a more limited 
range of remedies than those available through civil protection orders. 
                                                                                                                                 
with Female Genital Mutilation. Here’s How the Law Came to Be, L.A. TIMES, (Apr. 18, 
2017), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-female-genital-mutilation-detroit-2017-sto 
ry.html [https://perma.cc/TTM7-33ZQ]. 
99  These challenges also have undermined criminal prosecution as an effective response to 
forced marriage in United Kingdom. Since the United Kingdom criminalized forced mar-
riage in 2014, only one case reportedly has been prosecuted. The case is an outlier in many 
ways, including that it was brought against the intended spouse (not parents or relatives) of 
the victim, and the alleged conduct involved allegations of numerous acts of physical and 
sexual violence. Businessman Is First Person Jailed Under Forced Marriage Laws, 
GUARDIAN (June 10, 2015, 10:17AM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/ 
jun/10/34-year-old-man-first-person-to-be-convicted-under-forced-marriage-laws [https://per 
ma.cc/WGA7-ULU8]. 
100  See GLOBAL ESTIMATES OF MODERN SLAVERY, supra note 94, at 49. 
101  In Virginia, for example, remedies ordered through a child in need of supervision pro-
ceeding, including a child protection order and the appointment of a guardian ad litem ena-
bled a minor to remain in her family home while also being protected from a forced mar-
riage. Interview with Jeanne Smoot, Senior Policy Attorney, Tahirih Just. Ctr. (July 2017). 
102  Id. 
103  ALA. CODE § 12-15-138 (2017); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-234 (2017); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 19-1-114 (2018); IDAHO CODE § 16-1619 (2017); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-25 
(2018); IND. CODE § 31-34-2.3-1 (2017); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 618 (2018); ME. STAT. 
tit. 22, § 4035 (2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 455.505 (2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-427 
(2017); NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.400 (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:19 (2017); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.55 (West 2017); N.Y. FAM. CT. LAW § 1056 (McKinney 2018); OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 22, § 60.19 (2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-7A-107 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 37-1-152 (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-202 (West 2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253 
(2017); WIS. STAT. § 48.45 (2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-430 (2017). 
104  See infra Section II.C.2. 
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A separate, shared potential drawback of criminal, abuse and neglect, and 
child protection order proceedings for those facing forced marriages is the lack 
of control such individuals have over these processes. Criminal and child abuse 
proceedings are initiated and directed by the state, and child protection order 
proceedings are initiated and directed by the state or a designated adult on be-
half of a minor child. Exercising control over how a case is presented and the 
remedies sought may be critical to the willingness of adults and older minors to 
seek legal relief.105 Such autonomy may be especially important to individuals 
who want to remain closely connected to their families or protect family mem-
bers from embarrassment or other potentially negative repercussions from the 
case. 
Tort law may be pointed to as a potential avenue for legal relief that pro-
vides an opportunity for an individual facing a forced marriage to exercise con-
trol over the legal proceeding.106 Although tort may provide a promising source 
of compensation for individuals harmed by forced marriage, and can also pro-
vide a path to an injunction—a civil court order that compels a defendant to re-
spect a victim’s rights by directing the defendant to take or avoid specific ac-
tion.107 Nevertheless, several procedural hurdles undermine the viability of tort 
claims as a preventive tool.108 First, minor children are prohibited from bring-
                                                        
105  Recognizing that the need to involve an adult might deter minors from seeking assis-
tance, many states have granted teenagers the authority to make autonomous decisions about 
issues relating to their health, well-being, and safety. Lisa Vollendorf Martin, What’s Love 
Got to Do with It: Securing Access to Justice for Teens, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 457, 503–05 
(2012) (matters over which states have granted minors decision-making power include 
treatment for emergency medical care, substance abuse, sexually transmitted illnesses, men-
tal health services, reproductive health services). Several states have likewise authorized mi-
nors to seek civil protection orders to protect themselves from dating and domestic violence 
without adult involvement. See infra Section II.C.3.b. 
106  Douglas D. Scherer, Tort Remedies for Victims of Domestic Abuse, 43 S.C. L. REV. 543, 
564–65 (1992) (noting that tort claims enable an individual to exercise control over the pro-
ceeding). Tort claims compensate individuals for wrongs done to them by other persons. 
Tort, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
107  Tamara L. Kuennen, “No-Drop” Civil Protection Orders: Exploring the Bounds of Judi-
cial Intervention in the Lives of Domestic Violence Victims, 16 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 54–
55 (2007). 
108  A plaintiff can request the court to enter an injunction under its powers of equity as part 
of its exercise of jurisdiction over a tort claim. When evaluating a claim for an equitable in-
junction in a tort case, courts must consider: 
(1) the nature of the interest to be protected, (2) the relative adequacy to the plaintiff of the in-
junction and other remedies, (3) any unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in bringing suit, (4) any 
related misconduct on the part of the plaintiff, (5) the relative hardship likely to result to defend-
ant if injunction is granted and to plaintiff if denied, (6) the interests of third persons and the 
public, (7) the practicality of framing and enforcing the judgment. 
Jeffrey R. Baker, The Failure and Promise of Common Law Equity in Domestic Abuse Cas-
es, 58 LOY. L. REV. 559, 579–80 (2012) (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 936 
(2011)). To support the issuance of a temporary injunction during the pendency of the case, 
the plaintiff further must establish “(1) the extent of the threat of irreparable harm to the 
plaintiff if the interlocutory injunction is not granted, (2) the consequences that the interlocu-
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ing tort cases against their parents in many states.109 Second, tort claims com-
pensate retroactively; they may be brought only after harm/damages have been 
caused.110 This means that, even when a parent or another person attempting to 
force a marriage would be a permissible party in a tort case, a tort remedy for 
forced marriage only would be available after that individual takes action that 
actually causes harm to the plaintiff. Tort remedies would not be available to 
prevent a forced marriage or a related harm from occurring. Third, tort actions 
have a lengthy timeline for the issuance of relief, and do not provide a means to 
access immediate intervention.111 Fourth, those facing forced marriages may 
lack access to funds to cover the filing fees and costs that typically attend civil 
actions.112 Fifth, the process of seeking injunctive and compensatory relief 
through a tort action is complex and challenging to navigate without the assis-
tance of counsel.113 Finally, equitable injunctions issued within tort cases lack a 
ready enforcement mechanism. Violations are actionable as civil contempt, 
                                                                                                                                 
tory relief may have on the defendant, (3) the probability that the plaintiff will succeed on 
the merits, and (4) the public interest.” Id. at 580. 
109  The doctrine of parental immunity protects parents against tort claims arising out of con-
duct during a child’s minority that is “inherent to the parent-child relationship.” Elizabeth G. 
Porter, Tort Liability in the Age of the Helicopter Parent, 64 ALA. L. REV. 533, 545 (2013). 
As of 2013, more than half of states continued to recognize this doctrine. Id. The doctrine is 
intended to protect the privacy and harmony of the family. Id. at 539–53. These principles 
were likewise cited to justify the development of the doctrine of spousal immunity, which 
persisted well into the twentieth century, and was abrogated in light of the growing recogni-
tion that the sanctification of privacy facilitated male domination and abuse of women. Id. at 
549; Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 
YALE L.J. 2117, 2161–70 (1996). 
110  Baker, supra note 108, at 591. 
111  Id. at 588–89 (“If the need for relief is immediate, urgent, and not monetarily quantifia-
ble, tort actions are inadequate legal remedies; tort liability does not answer the victim’s 
needs.”); Jane K. Stoever, Enjoining Abuse: The Case for Indefinite Domestic Violence Pro-
tection Orders, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1015, 1063 (2014). By the time many individuals facing 
forced marriages reach out for help, they need immediate intervention and support. 
Swegman, Forced Child Marriage Case Scenarios for Lisa Martin, supra note 58. Emergen-
cy relief may be particularly important to prevent an individual from being taken abroad to 
marry because once an individual leaves the U.S., it becomes extraordinarily difficult for the 
government to intervene. Individuals taken abroad may have their passports taken from 
them, and may be physically isolated and cut off from outside communication. Consular of-
ficials may face significant challenges even locating and communicating with such persons, 
let alone assisting them to return to the United States. Individuals seeking to stave off inter-
national travel or an impending ceremony may need same-day court intervention and tempo-
rary ex parte relief. STOBART, supra note 86, at 14. 
112  Stoever, supra note 111, at 1063. 
113  Cf. Nina W. Tarr, Civil Orders for Protection: Freedom or Entrapment?, 11 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 157, 161–63 (2003) (describing the time and procedural complexities inherent 
in seeking a civil injunction through a divorce claim, the most common mechanism for vic-
tims of domestic abuse to secure injunctive relief before the creation of the civil protection 
order remedy). 
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which may amount to a “verbal ‘slap on the hand,’ ” or alternatively, could re-
sult in fines and even periods of jail time as a means to coerce compliance.114 
Together, these gaps and the limited insight we have into the wishes of in-
dividuals facing forced marriage suggest that ready access to a low-barrier, 
emergency civil injunctive remedy could meaningfully benefit this group. 
II. THE VIABILITY OF CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS TO PREVENT FORCED 
MARRIAGE 
A. The History and Goals of Civil Protection Orders 
In the domestic violence context, similar challenges in securing effective, 
accessible legal relief led to the establishment of the civil protection order rem-
edy in all fifty states and the District of Columbia.115 A product of the battered 
women’s movement of the 1960s and 70s, civil protection orders were created 
to prevent future abuse and enhance the autonomy of those subjected to domes-
tic violence.116 Over time, many states have expanded the context in which in-
dividuals can seek civil protection orders from domestic violence between 
spouses, family, and household members, to dating violence, stalking, and sex-
ual assault. Some states have integrated these additional bases for relief into 
their original domestic violence civil protection order statutes, whereas others 
have created separate protection orders for these expanded contexts.117 
Protection orders were revolutionary in enabling individuals subjected to 
domestic violence to reliably and expediently access the courts and secure en-
forceable legal relief tailored to their needs outside of divorce proceedings and 
criminal prosecutions.118 This enabled those subjected to abuse to seek legal 
protection without having to end their marriages or cooperate in seeking crimi-
nal penalties for those abusing them.119 Conversely, as law enforcement in the 
                                                        
114  Id.; David J. Harmer, Limiting Incarceration for Civil Contempt in Child Custody Cases, 
4 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 239, 243–44 (1990) (explaining that courts have inherent authority to 
hold parties in contempt for failure to comply with court orders). Punishments issued under a 
court’s civil contempt power are remedial—for the benefit of the party that the order pro-
tects. Id. at 247–48. 
115  Every state and the District of Columbia enacted a protection order statute between 1970 
and 1993. Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered 
Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 810 (1993). 
116  Barbara J. Hart, Civil Protection Orders, 43 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 5, 23 (1992); Klein & 
Orloff, supra note 115, at 810. 
117  Compare D.C. CODE § 16-1001 (2018), with FLA. STAT. §§ 741.28 (domestic violence 
injunction), 784.0485 (2017) (stalking injunction), 784.046 (2017) (dating and sexual vio-
lence injunction) (2017). 
118  LISA A. GOODMAN & DEBORAH EPSTEIN, LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN: A SURVIVOR-
CENTERED APPROACH TO ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH, AND JUSTICE 79 (2008); Hart, supra 
note 116, at 23; Stoever, supra note 111, at 1040–43; Tarr, supra note 113, at 161–63. 
119  Divorce was not a sure path to relief even for those who wanted to pursue it, and receiv-
ing injunctive relief as part of a divorce judgment was also not guaranteed. LEIGH 
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1970s and 80s rarely arrested or prosecuted perpetrators of domestic violence 
even in cases where prosecution was strongly desired, the advent of protection 
orders created a viable path to legal intervention.120 A number of features have 
made protection orders a comparatively accessible civil remedy, including: the 
availability of same-day emergency ex parte relief, expedited proceedings, the 
elimination of fees for filing and service of process, the creation of simplified 
court forms, and the common availability of courthouse-based advocates to as-
sist with the filing process.121 Where advocates are present, protection order 
proceedings also may serve as a gateway connecting those subjected to abuse to 
additional community social services resources.122 To enhance their deterrent 
effect, states imbued protection orders with stronger enforcement mechanisms 
than those associated with other civil injunctions, with many states making vio-
lation of a protection order a criminal offense as well as cause for criminal or 
civil contempt.123 To this end, civil protection orders offer an additional avenue 
                                                                                                                                 
GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 9 
(2012); Tarr, supra note 113, at 163. But cf. GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 5 (not-
ing that system actors frequently encourage or coerce those subjected to domestic violence to 
leave their relationships, and this pressure deters women from seeking help from social ser-
vices providers and the criminal justice system). Tort claims against abusive partners were 
often not available against spouses at this time because of the continued existence of the doc-
trine of spousal immunity, which has since been abrogated. See Baker, supra note 108, at 
602–03. For a number of reasons, many who are subjected to abuse do not want their part-
ners to go to jail and may find the relief offered by protection orders more beneficial to them 
or their children than prosecution. Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders 
for Domestic Violence: Can Law Help End the Abuse without Ending the Relationship?, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 1508 (2008). 
120  GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 71–73; GOODMARK, supra note 119, at 9. 
121  Goldfarb, supra note 119, at 1506; Tarr, supra note 113, at 163–65. Several common fea-
tures of protection orders across states, including the elimination of filing fees and provision 
of cost-free assistance with service of process, have resulted from conditions upon federal 
funding instituted through the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 and its subsequent re-
authorizations. See, e.g., Costs for Criminal Charges and Protection Orders, 34 U.S.C. 
§ 10450 (2012); Sarah Henry & Monica N. Player, VAWA Prohibition on Fees for Service of 
Protection Orders: Implications for Law Enforcement Agencies, NAT’L CTR. ON PROT. 
ORDERS AND FULL FAITH & CREDIT (2013), http://www.bwjp.org/assets/documents/pdfs/va 
wa_prohibition_on_fees_for_service_of_protection_orders.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NXZ-
3SK4]. Accessing the remedy still poses challenges to self-represented parties as court forms 
can be complex, a contested evidentiary hearing may be required to secure relief. Goldfarb, 
supra note 119, at 1515–16 (the process of obtaining an order can be “difficult, confusing, 
and time-consuming,” as well as “upsetting, intimidating, or embarrassing” for petitioners, 
and is more likely to be successful if petitioners have counsel or are supported by advocates 
and other system actors); Tarr, supra note 113, at 163–65. 
122  Goldfarb, supra note 119, at 1509. 
123  Id. at 1516–17; Hart, supra note 116, at 20–21. 
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into the criminal justice system for those who want to hold their abusers crimi-
nally accountable for continued abuse.124 
Civil protection orders are not a panacea, and may have unexpected nega-
tive consequences. For example, mandatory arrest and “no drop” policies may 
result in criminal prosecution of respondents for protection order violations 
against petitioners’ wishes,125 and court findings of protection order violations 
can result in deportation for non-citizen respondents.126 Moreover, petitioners 
who obtain protection orders may face discrimination in housing, insurance, 
and employment.127 Despite these potential drawbacks, protection orders have 
become the most widely used civil or criminal remedy to combat domestic vio-
lence in the United States and petitioners who obtain orders express a consist-
ently high level of satisfaction with the remedy.128 Protection orders have 
proved effective at eliminating or decreasing violence and increasing petition-
ers’ feelings of safety and autonomy.129 
B. The Potential for Civil Protection Orders to Prevent Forced Marriage 
Forced marriage is a different problem from domestic violence, and re-
quires its own nuanced solutions. Yet, the problems share characteristics that 
suggest that civil protection orders may be an effective tool to prevent forced 
marriage. First, the comparative control exercised by petitioners in civil protec-
tion order proceedings over whether and how to pursue a case, the remedies 
sought, and whether and how to enforce court orders may encourage those fac-
ing forced marriages to seek relief.130 Second, those facing forced marriage may 
                                                        
124  Stoever, supra note 111, at 1043. But see GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 80 
(noting that problems remain with police willingness to take action in response to complaints 
of protection order violations). 
125  Tarr, supra note 113, at 191–92. 
126  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) (2012); Cecelia M. Espenoza, No Relief for the Weary: 
VAWA Relief Denied for Battered Immigrants Lost in the Intersections, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 
163, 180–81 (1999); GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 77. See generally Hannah R. 
Shapiro, Battered Immigrant Women Caught in the Intersection of U.S. Criminal and Immi-
gration Laws: Consequences and Remedies, 16 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 27, 27 (2002). 
127  See GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 130–31. 
128  Goldfarb, supra note 119, at 1510; Stoever, supra note 111, at 1020–21. 
129  Stoever, supra note 111, at 1021, 1064–66. But cf. Goldfarb, supra note 119, at 1511–14, 
1516 (noting that studies of compliance with protection orders have been somewhat mixed, 
with compliance seeming to turn, in part, on the petitioner’s feelings about ending the rela-
tionship, characteristics of the respondent, and the history of abuse within the relationship, as 
well as with a weak criminal justice system response to violations). 
130  This control over how a case is presented to the court, of course, does not equate to full 
control over the case result. For example, courts have denied petitioners’ requests to vacate 
protection orders, keeping the orders in place over petitioners’ objections and fined or im-
prisoned petitioners who initiate contact with respondents while an order is in place. 
GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 81. See generally Kuennen, supra note 107, at 54–
55. 
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need emergency intervention and expedited proceedings to bring some peace 
and stability into households and ongoing relationships. Third, those facing 
forced marriages who are financially dependent upon those they seek to restrain 
may be unable to retain counsel or afford filing fees and costs of litigation.131 
Finally, given the stakes involved, and the possibility that perpetrators may feel 
entitled by cultural notions of honor or familial role to persist with their behav-
ior, a civil remedy to prevent forced marriage may benefit from a strong, multi-
faceted enforcement regime.132 
C. The Fit of Civil Protection Orders to the Problem of Forced Marriage 
Although eligibility to seek a protection order varies by state, protection 
order statutes throughout the United States share a number of common fea-
tures.133 To qualify for relief, a petitioner typically must share a particular rela-
tionship to the perpetrator and have been subjected to, or threatened with, par-
ticular conduct.134 The two prongs of this analysis merge in the many states 
permitting the issuance of protection orders on the basis of sexual assault and 
stalking regardless of the identity of the perpetrator.135 Notably, a minor’s abil-
ity to access protection orders varies widely across states.136 Each of these fea-
tures of the protection order remedy potentially limit its viability in the forced 
marriage context. 
Potential petitioners seeking protection orders relating to forced marriage 
can be loosely grouped in three categories: (1) those seeking to prevent an im-
pending marriage before it occurs, (2) those who were forced into a marriage 
against their consent and now seek protection and/or to escape, and (3) those 
who married consensually, but now feel forced to remain married and seek to 
escape.137 Protection orders are available to varying extents to individuals in 
each of these groups. Civil protection orders are most likely to provide a viable 
remedy to prevent a forced marriage where a petitioner is an adult, is seeking to 
restrain a parent, relative, or household member, and has been subjected to or 
threatened with physical violence. After a forced marriage occurs, as well as 
when a person feels forced to remain in a marriage s/he entered consensually, 
protection orders are most viable if the petitioner seeks to restrain her spouse or 
seeks to protect herself from acts or threats of violence by parents or relatives. 
                                                        
131  See supra INTRODUCTION. 
132  See supra INTRODUCTION. 
133  Stoever, supra note 111, at 1043. 
134  See generally Klein & Orloff, supra note 115, at 814–42, 848. 
135  See infra Section II.C.2.c.ii. 
136  See generally Martin, supra note 105, at 503. 
137  See generally supra Section I.B. 
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1. Qualifying Relationships 
To establish standing to seek a protection order, a petitioner typically must 
first establish that she shares a qualifying relationship with the respondent.138 
Protection order laws in many states have evolved from applying only to 
spouses and household members, to offering protection within other intimate 
relationships, and against perpetrators of rape and stalking, regardless of the 
relationship between the parties.139 Under the relationship requirement, whether 
a petitioner can seek a protection order to prevent a forced marriage turns on 
the identity of those attempting to coerce her. As the factual context of forced 
marriages differ from case to case, petitioners in forced marriage cases may 
need to pursue relief against a variety of actors. 
a. Parents 
In many forced marriage cases, parents play a central role in coercing the 
union.140 Most states permit the entry of domestic violence protection orders 
between children and parents.141 Some of these expressly provide protection 
between parents and children, whereas others protect blood relatives and/or 
current and former household members—groups that often include parents and 
children.142 Some states limit the remedy to children and parents who share or 
have shared a residence, whereas others prohibit minor children from obtaining 
protection orders against parents with whom they reside.143 A handful of states 
do not allow minor children to pursue domestic violence protection orders 
against parents.144 In these states, minor children must seek relief from their 
                                                        
138  Professor Deborah Epstein first introduced me to the terms “qualifying relationship” and 
“qualifying conduct” to describe the common elements a petitioner must prove to justify the 
entry of a civil protection order. Deborah Epstein et al., Domestic Relations: Domestic Vio-
lence, in DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PRACTICE MANUAL (2016). 
139  Hart, supra note 116, at 5; Martin, supra note 105, at 493; Stoever, supra note 111, at 
1043–45. 
140  Swegman, Forced Child Marriage Case Scenarios for Lisa Martin, supra note 58. 
141  See infra APPENDIX 1. 
142  See infra APPENDIX 1. 
143  Compare ALA. CODE § 30-5-2 (2017), FLA. STAT. § 741.28 (2017), IOWA CODE § 236.2 
(2017), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102 (2017), MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3 (2017), and VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1101, 1103 (2017), with N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1 (2017). The 
District of Columbia explicitly precludes custodial parents from seeking protection orders 
against minor children. Instead, these parents must seek court assistance through the Persons 
In Need of Supervision (PINS) program in the juvenile court. D.C. CODE § 16-1003(a)(6) 
(2018). 
144  IOWA CODE § 236.2 (2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2950(27)(b) (2018); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1 (2017) (prohibits minor children from seeking relief against parents 
with whom they reside); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19 (West 2017); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 107.705 (2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-102 (West 2017) (if petitioner is a minor); 
WIS. STAT. § 813.12 (2017); D.M.H. ex rel. Hefel v. Thompson, 577 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Iowa 
1998) (holding that Iowa’s protection order statute grants minors standing only to seek pro-
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parents through the child abuse and neglect system, or by seeking a child pro-
tection order.145 
b. Family and Household Members 
Those facing forced marriages might also experience coercion from other 
relatives, family friends, or community members. Most states permit the entry 
of domestic violence protection orders against additional relatives by blood or 
marriage.146 A few states require that such relatives share a household to quali-
fy for relief.147 The majority of states also permit the entry of protection orders 
against any household members, regardless of the nature of their relationships 
to the petitioner.148 Several states limit eligible household members to those 
who share an intimate or familial relationship with the petitioner.149 
                                                                                                                                 
tection against spouses and individuals with whom they are cohabiting and precludes stand-
ing to seek protection against parents and other household members); M.A. v. E.A., 909 
A.2d 1168, 1171 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (precluding a mother from bringing a 
claim on behalf of her minor daughter against the child’s stepfather because the statute per-
mitted only persons over eighteen or emancipated minors to bring claims against household 
members); Strother v. Strother, 34 P.3d 736, 737 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (overturning a protec-
tion order sought by a mother on behalf of her minor child against the child’s father because 
the statute did not offer protection to minors against parents); see also APPENDIX 4. 
145  STATE OF N.H. JUDICIAL BRANCH FAMILY DIV. & DIST. COURT, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
PROTOCOLS 5 (2013). In Wyoming, child protection orders are available only as part of the 
final disposition of a child abuse and neglect case. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-430 (2017); see 
also supra Section I.G. 
146  See infra APPENDIX 1. Some states permit a broad range of relatives to seek relief, where-
as others designate only certain relationships, such as siblings, or grandpar-
ents/grandchildren. Compare ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990 (2017) (related up to the fourth de-
gree of consanguinity), D.C. CODE § 16-1001 (2018) (relatives by blood, adoption, legal 
custody, marriage, or domestic partnership), and 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-1 (2017) (per-
sons related by blood or marriage), with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 901(12), 1041(2) (2017) 
(grandparents, grandchildren, siblings), N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2 (2018) (grandparents 
and grandchildren), and VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (2017) (siblings, grandparents and 
grandchildren). 
147  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-5-2 (2017) (relative of an individual who qualifies as a current 
or former “household member” if the relative also lived with the defendant); FLA. STAT. 
§ 741.28 (2017); IOWA CODE § 236.2 (2017) (reside together or resided together within one 
year of the assault); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.720 (West 2018); ME. STAT. tit. 19A, § 4002 
(2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3 (2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-206 (2017); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (West 2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (2017) (parents-in-law, 
children-in-law, or siblings-in-law covered only if cohabit). 
148  See ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990 (2017); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601(A)(4) (2017); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103 (2017); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6211 (West 2018); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 13-14-101 (2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38a(2) (2017); D.C. CODE § 16-1001 
(2018); FLA. STAT. § 741.28 (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-1 (2017); HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 586-1 (2017); IDAHO CODE § 39-6303 (2017); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214 (2018); IOWA 
CODE § 236.2 (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102 (2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.720 
(West 2018) (unrestricted only if the victim is a child); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 1 
(2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2950 (2018); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2017); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 93-21-3 (2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 455.010 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-903 
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c. Intended Spouse 
In some cases, an intended spouse may play a role in attempting to force a 
marriage.150 Whether a potential victim of forced marriage could seek protec-
tion against an intended spouse turns on the nature of their relationship at the 
time the case is filed. Although all states offer protection order relief against 
spouses,151 and a solid majority extend relief against dating partners,152 only a 
minority of states offer explicit protection for engagement relationships.153 This 
distinction is important in the forced marriage context. To find that parties have 
a qualifying dating relationship, courts may have to consider factors such as the 
length of the relationship;154 the frequency of the parties’ interaction;155 the par-
                                                                                                                                 
(2017); NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.018 (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1 (2017); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19 (West 2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 14-07.1-01 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (West 2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, 
§ 60.1 (2017); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.705 (2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-20 (2017); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 36-3-601 (2017); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.003 (West 2017); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78B-7-102 (West 2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1101 (2017), 1103 (2017); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.010 (2017); W. VA. CODE § 48-27-
204 (2017); WIS. STAT. § 813.12 (2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-102 (2017). 
149  ALA. CODE § 30-5-2 (2017) (stating that a person must have had an intimate relationship 
with the defendant or be a relative of someone who did); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1041 
(2017) (stating that cohabitants must hold themselves out as a couple); HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 586-1 (2017) (excludes those cohabiting “only by virtue of an economic or contractual af-
filiation.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.720 (West 2018) (member of an unmarried couple 
unless the victim is a child, then no restriction as to relationship); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:2132 
(2017) (“sexual or intimate relationship”); ME. STAT. tit. 19A, § 4002 (2017) (“related by 
consanguinity or affinity”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-206 (2017) (includes “other past or 
present family members of a household.”); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6102 (2018) (“persons liv-
ing as spouses”). 
150  McFarlane et al., supra note 25, at 708. 
151  See infra APPENDIX 1; see also Klein & Orloff, supra note 115, at 814–15. 
152  See infra APPENDIX 1. 
153  ALA. CODE § 30-5-2(3)b. (2017) (“A dating relationship includes the period of engage-
ment to be married.”); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6211 (2018); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-1 (2017); 
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214 (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 1 (2017). Protection or-
ders could also be available against fiancés in North Dakota, which permits a protection or-
der to be issued if the parties are deemed by the court to have a “sufficient relationship.” 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01 (2017); Id. § 14-07.1.02 (2017); OKLA. STAT. tit., 22, § 60.1 
(2017); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-1 (2017) (note that R.I. extends protection to engagement 
or dating relationships only where one party is a minor). 
154  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601(A)(4) (2017); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103 
(2017); DEL. CODE ANN. § 10-1041 (2017); IDAHO CODE § 39-6303 (2017); IOWA CODE 
§ 236.2 (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102 (2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 456.030 (West 
2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:2132 (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 1 (2017); MINN. 
STAT. § 518B.01 (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3 (2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19 
(West 2017); N.Y. FAM. CT. LAW § 812 (McKinney 2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1 (2017); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-3.1 (2017); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.003 (West 2017); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-402 (West 2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1101 (2017); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 26.50.010 (2017). 
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ties’ expectations about the romantic, affectionate, or sexual nature of the rela-
tionship;156 whether the parties have affirmed their relationship to others;157 and 
attendance at social outings as a couple.158 Ordinary fraternization and casual 
social relationships do not give rise to grounds for relief.159 
Statutes that extend protection within dating relationships could appear suf-
ficient to extend protection to fiancées as well, since romantic love and court-
ship commonly precedes marriage in the United States.160 In the case of a 
forced marriage, however, protecting only dating partners and spouses leaves a 
gap, since the petitioner may have no relationship with an intended spouse, let 
alone an intimate one. In such circumstances, a potential forced marriage vic-
tim may have no relationship-based ground to seek protection against an in-
tended spouse and may need to rely instead on conduct-based grounds for re-
lief. 
d. Crime-Based Relationships 
A number of states also have established crime-based relationship grounds 
for protection orders. These provisions permit protection orders to be entered 
against any individual who subjects a petitioner to particular crimes. 
                                                                                                                                 
155  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601(A)(4) (2017); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103 
(2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1041 (2017); FLA. STAT. § 784.046 (2017); IDAHO CODE 
§ 39-6303 (2017); IOWA CODE § 236.2 (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102 (2017); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 456.030 (West 2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:2132 (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
209A, § 1 (2017); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3 (2017); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-903 (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.018 (2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2C:25-19 (West 2017); N.Y. FAM. CT. LAW § 812 (McKinney 2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 25-10-3.1 (2017); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.003 (West 2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-
7-402 (West 2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1101 (2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.010 
(2017). 
156  See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6211 (2018); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-1 (2017); IDAHO CODE 
§ 39-6303 (2017); IOWA CODE § 236.2 (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102 (2017); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 456.030 (West 2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:2132 (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
209A, § 1 (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-903 (2017); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.018 (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1 (2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2C:25-19 (West 2017); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.705 (2018); Id. § 107.726 (West 2017); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-402 (West 2017). 
157  See, e.g., S.K. v. J.H., 43 A.3d 1248, 1250 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012). 
158  See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 456.010 (West 2018). 
159  See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103 (2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1041 (2015); 
FLA. STAT. § 784.046 (2017); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-1 (2017); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214 
(2018); IOWA CODE § 236.2 (2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 456.030 (West 2018); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 93-21-3 (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.018 (201); N.Y. FAM. CT. LAW § 812 
(McKinney 2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1 (2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 60.1 (2017); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601 (2017); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.003 (West 2017); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78B-7-402 (West 2017); W. VA. CODE § 48-27-204 (2017). 
160  D’vera Cohn, Love and Marriage, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 13, 2013) (summarizing results 
of a Pew poll showing that Americans view love as a primary reason to marry). 
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i. Stalking 
Many states would permit a potential victim of forced marriage to seek a 
protection order against any perpetrator of stalking, regardless of her relation-
ship to the perpetrator.161 Some of these states have granted victims of stalking 
or harassment access to domestic violence protection orders,162 whereas others 
created a separate stalking or harassment protection order remedy for this 
group.163 A few states only extend protection order relief to victims of stalking 
or harassment who share another qualifying relationship with the offender.164 
Stalking protection orders might provide an alternative route to protection 
against forced marriage in circumstances where a domestic violence protection 
order is unavailable—for example, where minor children are prohibited from 
filing against parents or relatives, engagement relationships do not qualify, or 
stalking or harassment is not qualifying conduct.165 However, some states ex-
plicitly preclude this approach.166 Specific challenges raised by pursuing stalk-
ing orders in the context of forced marriage are further discussed in below. 
ii. Sexual Assault 
Forced marriages often result in rape.167 Those facing forced marriages 
who fear that their marriage will lead to rape may want legal protection to pre-
vent that outcome. A number of states permit victims of sexual assault to seek 
civil protection orders against their assailants, regardless of the nature of their 
relationship.168 As with stalking, some states have granted victims of sexual as-
sault access to domestic violence protection orders, whereas other states have 
created a separate protection order remedy for this group.169 Pursuing protec-
                                                        
161  See infra APPENDIX 1. 
162  See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1001 (2018); IND. CODE § 34-26-5-2(a)(2) (2017); ME. 
STAT. tit. 19A, § 4005 (2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 455.020(1) (2017); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 40-15-102(2)(a) (2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2(D)(1) (2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, 
§ 60.2 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-602(a) (2017). 
163  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6(a)–(b)(3) (West 2018); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & 
JUD. PROC. § 3-1503(a)(7) (West 2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-3-506 (2017). 
164  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-5-1 (2018); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3 (2017); N.Y. FAM. CT. 
LAW § 812 (McKinney 2018). 
165  See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 30.866 (2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-21-102 (2017); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 7-3-506 (2017). 
166  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-16a (2017); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-
1503 (West 2018) (restricting access to peace orders to individuals not eligible to seek do-
mestic violence protection orders); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2950(28)(b) (2018) (precluding 
minors from seeking protection orders against parents on grounds of stalking or sexual as-
sault). 
167  See supra INTRODUCTION. 
168  See infra APPENDIX 1. 
169  Compare D.C. CODE § 16-1001 (2018); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 455.010(1)(e), 455.020(1) 
(2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-102(2)(a) (2017), with FLA. STAT. § 784.046 (2017); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.214 (West 2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 60.2(A) (2017). 
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tion orders as sexual assault victims, in theory, could provide those facing 
forced marriages an alternative basis for relief.170 Most states define victims of 
sexual assault for protection order purposes as a person who already has been 
assaulted.171 In some states, a person facing a forced marriage theoretically 
could seek to establish that the efforts to force their marriage amount to an at-
tempted or threatened rape.172 As discussed in Section I.C.2.b, in practice, indi-
viduals who have not been sexually assaulted at the time they seek a protection 
order may face a number of challenges to securing relief on this basis. 
2. Qualifying Conduct 
Civil protection order statutes were first created in tandem with policy re-
forms aimed at enhancing the law enforcement response to domestic violence 
and they remain rooted in criminal law.173 In addition to establishing a qualify-
ing relationship with the respondent, a petitioner seeking a civil protection or-
der must demonstrate that the respondent engaged in qualifying conduct. In 
most states, this requires a petitioner to prove that the respondent committed or 
threatened to commit one or more designated acts. Some states permit the issu-
ance of a protection order upon proof that the respondent has committed any 
criminal offense against the petitioner.174 Others limit qualifying conduct to a 
defined list of acts—often criminal offenses.175 Still others take a hybrid ap-
                                                        
170  In a state like New Jersey, minor children are prohibited from seeking domestic violence 
protection orders against parents but permitted to seek sexual assault protection orders 
against any assailant, which could include parents. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-14 (West 2017). 
This approach may be undercut by the statute’s grant of standing to parents or guardians to 
file such petitions on behalf of minor victims of sexual assault, which could be read to pro-
hibit minors from pursuing relief without the involvement of a parent or guardian. Id.; see 
also Martin, supra note 105, at 466. By contrast, Michigan and Oregon (two states that also 
preclude minors from seeking domestic violence protection orders against parents) explicitly 
prohibit minor children from obtaining sexual assault protection orders against adult family 
members. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2950(27)(a) (2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.763(1)(b) 
(2018). 
171  See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 22/103 (2018); IND. CODE § 34-26-5-1(a)(2) (2017); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2950a (2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-3-506 (2017). 
172  MO. REV. STAT. §§ 455.010(1)(e), 455.020(1) (2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-14 (West 
2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601(7) (2017) (including any person who has been subject-
ed to, threatened with, or placed in fear of any form of rape or sexual battery); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 12, § 5133(a) (2017); WIS. STAT. § 813.125(1), (3) (2017). 
173  GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 71–72; GOODMARK, supra note 119, at 9–10. 
174  In such states, it may be left to the courts to develop the contours. See, e.g., D.C. CODE 
§ 16-1003 (2018) (requiring a petitioner to prove that a “criminal offense” has been commit-
ted against the petitioner’s person); Murphy v. Okeke, 951 A.2d 783, 788 (D.C. 2008) (hold-
ing that unlawful entry may constitute a qualifying crime against a petitioner’s person for 
purposes of the District’s civil protection order statute if the circumstances indicate that the 
petitioner’s physical safety was at risk). 
175  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-101 (2018); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103 (2018); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.720 (West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 1 (2017); NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 33.018 (2018). 
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proach, listing both specific acts or offenses and unspecified “other criminal 
conduct” as sufficient to justify relief.176 Qualifying conduct can include not 
only completed acts, but also attempts to commit listed offenses,177 and aiding, 
abetting, or conspiring in the commission of a listed offense.178 
Some states require not only a showing that particular conduct occurred, 
but also that it threated the petitioner’s safety.179 Demonstrating the imminence 
of a threat to one’s safety may pose a particular challenge to individuals who 
are deliberately deprived of information about marriage plans in order to reduce 
opportunities for resistance.180 
My research identified only one state to date—Texas—that permits the is-
suance of a protection order upon a finding that a family or household member 
engaged in acts or omissions “forcing or coercing a child to enter into a mar-
riage.”181 In addition, the District of Columbia permits the issuance of a protec-
tion order upon a finding that a respondent committed any criminal offense 
against the petitioner, and the District criminalizes forced marriage, which 
means that a petitioner arguably could seek a protection order on the basis of a 
threatened forced marriage there.182 In most states, a petitioner seeking a pro-
tection order in the context of a forced marriage must allege that the respondent 
has committed another qualifying crime against her. 
a. Physical Violence 
Individuals subjected to acts and threats of violence have the clearest path 
to securing relief. All states designate crimes or acts of physical violence as 
qualifying conduct;183 most include threats of physical harm;184 and a number 
                                                        
176  See infra APPENDIX 3. 
177  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-5-2 (2017); ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(a) (2017); CAL. FAM. 
CODE § 6320 (West 2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-101 (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 
§ 3906 (2017); IND. CODE § 34-26-5-1 (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102 (2017); ME. 
STAT. tit. 19-a, § 4002 (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 1 (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 93-21-3 (2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 455.010 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-903 (2017); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1 (2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 3113.31 (West 2017); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.705 (2018); 23 PA CONS. STAT. § 6102 (2017); 
15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-1 (2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1-2(9) (2017); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 36-3-601 (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-1 (West 2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, 
§ 1101 (2017); W. VA. CODE § 48-27-202 (2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-102 (2017). 
178  See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-1-2(9), 22-19A-8 (2017) (conspiracy to commit a 
listed felony crime can justify the issuance of a “crime of violence” protection order); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 77-36-1 (West 2017) (conspiracy or solicitation to commit a listed offense 
against a qualifying individual). 
179  See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1 (2017). 
180  VIGIL, REPORT TO THE HOUSE, supra note 7, at 8. 
181  TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. §§ 71.004, 261.001(1)(M) (West 2017). 
182  D.C. CODE §§ 16-1005(c), 22-2705(a)(3) (2018). 
183  See infra APPENDIX 3. 
184  See infra APPENDIX 3. 
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include kidnapping, unlawful restraint, and false imprisonment.185 Minor peti-
tioners seeking protection against their parents also may need to demonstrate 
that the parental conduct at issue did not amount to reasonable parental disci-
pline.186 
b. Rape 
Petitioners seeking protection against a forced marriage might also seek to 
establish that the respondent is conspiring, attempting, or threatening to subject 
the petitioner to rape. Such petitioners might consider the attempt to force mar-
riage itself as an attempt to force unwanted sex with the intended spouse.187 The 
law has long recognized sexual intimacy as a fundamental feature of the marital 
relationship.188 Historically, state codes authorized annulment upon proof of 
sexual incapacity,189 and criminalized sex outside of marriage through adultery 
and fornication offenses.190 Because of the centrality of sexual intercourse to 
                                                        
185  See infra APPENDIX 3. 
186  See, e.g., Chronister ex rel. Morrison v. Brenneman, 742 A.2d 190, 193 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1999) (The court held that the father’s actions of hitting the child with a belt across the rear 
only amounted to corporal punishment, not abuse, which is allowed for parental discipline); 
Beermann v. Beermann, 559 N.W.2d 868, 872–73 (S.D. 1997) (Father’s use of force to keep 
his daughter in a sitting position was not abuse and was within reasonable parental disci-
pline; however, the accompanying aggression and volatile language could make the action 
amount to actionable conduct); John P.W. ex rel. Adam W. v. Dawn D.O., 591 S.E.2d 260, 
263, 265–66 (W. Va. 2003) (It is within the right of a parent to temporarily restrain their 
child for means of talking to them. The mother’s actions of grabbing her son’s arm fit within 
this definition and constitute reasonable parental discipline). 
187  See, e.g., Forced Marriage Initiative—Success Story—Stefanie, TAHIRIH JUST. CTR., 
http://preventforcedmarriage.org/success-stories-2/ [https://perma.cc/K6WD-Q9AJ] (de-
scribing story of “Stefanie,” a thirteen-year-old American citizen who escaped from her fa-
ther’s home in Saudi Arabia as he was planning her marriage, noting that she was afraid of 
being raped by her potential husband and facing increasing psychological and physical abuse 
by her father and step-mother). 
188  Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210 (1888) (Marriage “is an institution, in the mainte-
nance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the fam-
ily and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress”); Oberge-
fell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (“The nature of marriage is that, through its 
enduring bond, two persons together can find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, 
and spirituality.”). 
189  See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-3 (2017) (a marriage may be annulled “between persons 
either of whom is at the time physically impotent”); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 140(d) (McKin-
ney 2018) (action to annul a marriage on the ground that one of the parties was physically 
incapable of entering into the marriage state may be maintained); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 
§ 6.106 (West 2017) (“an annulment of a marriage [may be granted] if: (1) either party . . . 
was permanently impotent at the time of the marriage. . . .”). 
190  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 798.01 (2017) (“Whoever lives in an open state of adultery shall 
be guilty of a misdemeanor. . . .”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-40 (2018) (“Fornication is a 
Class B misdemeanor.”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-501(b) (West 2018) (“A person 
who [commits adultery] is guilty of a misdemeanor. . . .”); MINN. STAT. § 609.34 (2017) 
(“When any man and single woman have sexual intercourse with each other, each is guilty of 
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marriage, an attempt to force a marriage arguably could constitute an attempt to 
force sexual contact between the spouses. When an individual does not consent 
to a marriage, it can be inferred that she also would not consent to sex within 
that marriage. Thus, a petitioner potentially could argue that a third party’s at-
tempt to force her marriage constitutes an attempt to force the petitioner’s rape 
within the marriage, or perhaps amounts to a threat of rape.191 The historical 
failure of the criminal justice system to respond to complaints of marital rape 
lends credence to fears that individuals forced into marriage may be unprotect-
ed from sexual violence.192 
Courts have drawn an analogous connection between facilitating a mar-
riage and facilitating sex in the context of underage marriages. In at least two 
cases, courts convicted parents who enabled their minor children to marry be-
fore the children reached the minimum marriage of child endangerment or con-
tributing to the delinquency of a minor.193 Each conviction rested, in part, on 
the assumption that the marriage would result in the child engaging in sex with 
her spouse, despite that neither court appeared to have been presented with evi-
dence of whether or not sexual relations actually had occurred within the mar-
riage.194 These courts did not take up the issue of whether the parents’ actions 
could amount to a conspiracy to commit rape. Indeed, the courts’ analyses ap-
pear to assume that the sex acts occurring within the marriages would be con-
                                                                                                                                 
fornication, which is a misdemeanor.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 (2017) (“[persons] 
guilty of the crime of adultery or fornication shall be liable to indictment and, on conviction, 
shall be severally punished. . . .”). See generally Laurence Drew Borten, Sex, Procreation, 
and the State Interest in Marriage, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1089, 1114 (2002). 
191  Commentators similarly have argued that state laws that permit parents to consent to the 
marriage of a minor under the age of consent essentially permit parents to consent to a mi-
nor’s ongoing statutory rape. Erin K. Jackson, Addressing the Inconsistency Between Statu-
tory Rape Laws and Underage Marriage: Abolishing Early Marriage and Removing the 
Spousal Exemption to Statutory Rape, 85 UMKC L. REV. 343, 345 (2017). 
192  See generally Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 
88 CALIF. L. REV. 1373, 1492 (2000). 
193  People v. Benu, 385 N.Y.S.2d 222, 223 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1976); State v. Gans, 151 N.E.2d 
709, 714–15 (Ohio 1958); see also Associated Press, Minors’ Forced Marriages Lead to 3 
Arrests, L.A. TIMES, (Nov. 20, 1996) (an Iraqi refugee was charged with child abuse and his 
wife was charged with contributing to the delinquency of a minor after allegedly forcing his 
thirteen and fourteen year-old daughters to marry men more than fifteen years older than 
they were; the husbands were charged with sexual assault of a child). 
194  In State v. Gans, the court reasoned that the “propensity among young married couples to 
propagate,” as well as the onerous duties of homemaking, were likely to lead to the minor 
daughter’s truancy, and were she to remain in school, the mature “knowledge and attitudes” 
the minor daughter would gain as a result of her marriage would cause her to act in ways that 
would undermine the morals of her classmates. 151 N.E.2d at 714–15; see also Benu, 385 
N.Y.S.2d at 227 (quoting Gans to suggest that the “mating instinct” will take over within a 
marriage even if the parties are under the statutorily prescribed ages and pointing to harms 
that could befall the minor as a result, including being treated as chattel in the marriage, tru-
ancy, and the creation of a “chasm” between her and her classmates should she remain in 
school). 
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sensual. As a result, neither court considered the question of the child’s consent 
nor the parent’s intent regarding whether sexual contact would occur consensu-
ally. Nonetheless, the courts’ holdings are significant because they equate a 
parent’s facilitation of marriage with a parent’s facilitation of sex between the 
spouses in that marriage, and find parents criminally responsible for exposing 
their children to harms that could result from that sexual conduct. 
Although many states authorize protection orders on the basis of sexual as-
sault only if an assault already has occurred,195 several states permit petitioners 
who have experienced attempted or threatened sexual offenses to seek protec-
tion as well.196 To find that the conduct of a third party other than the assailant 
(such as a parent or relative forcing a marriage) constituted an attempt or threat 
of rape, a court likely would have to find that the third party intended or knew 
that sexual contact would occur in the marriage, and that such contact would 
occur without the petitioner’s consent. A respondent in such case could argue 
that he or she had no expectation that the marriage would result in rape, but ra-
ther that any sex would occur only with the petitioner’s consent. Petitioners 
may have more success with this approach in a jurisdiction like Tennessee, 
which permits protection orders to be issued upon a finding that a petitioner 
“has been placed in fear of any form of rape,” and thereby centers the court’s 
inquiry on the petitioner’s understanding of the respondent’s conduct. 
Alternatively, equating attempts to force marriage with attempted or threat-
ened rape may have greater force when a child is legally incapable of consent-
ing to sexual contact. Statutory rape laws establish an age before which minors 
are presumed unable to consent to sex, thereby criminalizing sex with all mi-
nors below that age, regardless of consent.197 Yet, state laws on marriage age 
complicate this argument. If a state approves a marriage involving a minor be-
low that age of consent, the state ostensibly sanctions sexual relations between 
                                                        
195  See sources cited supra note 171. 
196  See sources cited supra note 172. 
197  See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-103(a)(3) (2017) (engaging in sexual intercourse with 
someone under age fourteen who is at least three years younger); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-3 
(2017) (sexual intercourse with any person under the age of 16); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 510.020 (West 2018) (sexual act with someone unable to consent. “A person is deemed 
incapable of consent when he or she is . . . less than sixteen (16) years old. . . .”); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 39-13-506 (2017) (“Statutory rape is the unlawful sexual penetration of a vic-
tim by the defendant or of the defendant by the victim when: (1) The victim is at least thir-
teen (13) but less than fifteen (15) years of age and the defendant is at least four (4) years but 
less than ten (10) years older than the victim. . . .”). See generally Rigel Oliveri, Note, Statu-
tory Rape Law and Enforcement in the Wake of Welfare Reform, 52 STAN. L. REV. 463, 465 
(2000); ASAPH GLOSSER ET AL., LEWIN GRP., STATUTORY RAPE: A GUIDE TO STATE LAWS 
AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS (2004) (fifty-state survey of statutory rape laws and re-
quirements). 
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the minor and his or her spouse.198 A few states expressly exempt sex between 
spouses from statutory rape offenses.199 
Although the attempt to force a marriage could be argued to constitute a 
threat of rape for these reasons, my research has not identified a court that has 
made such a finding. Given the novel nature of the claim, it may be unlikely 
that a court would do so. 
c. Non (Physically) Violent Conduct 
Those facing forced marriages who experience non-physically violent 
means of coercion have a harder road to a remedy. The limited data on forced 
marriage in the United States suggests that those trying to force marriages often 
use emotional, psychological, and financial means of coercion, such as threat-
ening to harm or kill themselves, isolation, social ostracization; declaring the 
ruin of a family’s reputation; and threatening to withhold financial support, 
kick the individual out of the house, or have the individual deported.200 Al-
though these tactics exert significant power over potential victims, such con-
duct only will support the issuance of a protection order in most states if it con-
stitutes a criminal offense.201 
Individuals subjected to forms of coercion, other than the use or threat of 
physical violence, are ineligible for civil protection orders in a number of 
states.202 Petitioners in states with broader designations of qualifying conduct 
may be able to secure relief by demonstrating they suffered destruction of 
property,203 animal cruelty,204 purposeful isolation,205 or other conduct that in-
                                                        
198  Erin K. Jackson, Addressing the Inconsistency Between Statutory Rape Laws and Under-
age Marriage: Abolishing Early Marriage and Removing the Spousal Exemption to Statuto-
ry Rape, 85 UMKC L. REV. 343, 361–62 (2017). 
199  GLOSSER ET AL., supra note 197, at 10, stating: 
In some states, marriage is a defense to all [statutory rape] crimes listed (e.g., Alaska, District of 
Columbia, West Virginia); other states exclude some of the more aggravated [statutory rape] of-
fenses from this exemption (e.g., Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi). In a few states [e.g., South 
Carolina], the criminal [statutory rape] statutes identify age limits for the marriage exemptions. 
200  HEIMAN & SMOOT, supra note 8, at 8–9. 
201  Legal scholars have explored how the restriction of the civil protection order remedy to 
criminal conduct likewise presents obstacles to legal relief for those subjected to psychologi-
cal and economic forms of domestic violence. See GOODMARK, supra note 119, at 46; Mar-
garet E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaiming Domestic Vio-
lence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107, 1111 (2009). 
202  See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103 (2017); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-15 (2017); 
IDAHO CODE § 39-6303 (2017); IOWA CODE § 236.2 (2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.720 
(West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 1 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01 
(2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 60.1 (2017); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.705 (2018); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 19.2-152.9 (2017). 
203  ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(a) (2017) (criminal mischief); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6301 (West 
2018), 6320 (West 2018) (destroying personal property); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-1 (2017) 
(malicious property damage); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1 (2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2C:25-19 (West 2017) (criminal mischief); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5 (2018); N.Y. FAM. 
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terfered with their liberty or caused emotional distress.206 In most states, the 
most viable path to relief where only non-physical conduct has been used re-
quires situating the petitioner’s experiences within the criminal offenses of 
child endangerment or stalking and harassment. Each of these alternatives pre-
sent challenges in the forced marriage context. A few states include coercion, 
restraint of liberty, or other forms of emotional or psychological abuse as quali-
fying conduct; yet even under these grounds petitioners sometimes must 
demonstrate a nexus to physical violence.207 
i. Child Endangerment/Contributing to the Delinquency of a 
Minor 
A minor petitioner seeking protection against her parents could allege that 
their conduct amounts to child endangerment or contributes to the delinquency 
of a minor.208 In some states, a finding of child endangerment may require 
proof that a defendant willfully engaged in conduct likely to harm a child’s 
physical, mental, and moral welfare.209 Under broader conceptions of child en-
dangerment in some states, a defendant need not have a specific intent to injure 
the morals of the child.210 Rather, the defendant simply must undertake the rel-
evant actions knowingly and not by accident.211 At least one court has upheld a 
parent’s conviction for child endangerment after finding that a father “know-
ingly played an active part in the [marriage] ceremony” of his thirteen-year-old 
daughter to a seventeen-year-old boy.212 
                                                                                                                                 
CT. LAW § 812 (McKinney 2018) (criminal mischief); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601 (2017); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-1 (West 2017); WIS. STAT. §§ 813.122 (2017), 48.02 (2017). 
204  IND. CODE § 34-26-5-9 (2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2950 (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 33.018 (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601 
(2017). 
205  MO. REV. STAT. § 565.074.1(6) (2017) (“A person commits the crime of domestic assault 
in the third degree if the act involves a family or household member or an adult . . . and . . . 
(6) The person knowingly attempts to cause or causes the isolation of such family or house-
hold member by unreasonably and substantially restricting or limiting such family or house-
hold member’s access to other persons. . . .”). 
206  See infra Section II.C.2.c.iii, iv. 
207  Johnson, supra note 201, at 1133 (physical violence constitutes qualifying conduct in all 
states, coercion, restraint of liberty, or false imprisonment covered in only one third of states 
(most requiring a threat of physical harm), and psychological or emotional abuse covered in 
only one third of states). 
208  See infra APPENDIX 3. 
209  People v. Benu, 385 N.Y.S.2d 222, 226 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1976). 
210  Id. 
211  Id. 
212  Id. The court upheld the conviction in spite of its recognition that the father believed his 
actions were beneficial to the child, as he viewed her marriage as “a desirable alternative to 
fornication,” which he feared would occur after his daughter expressed interest in the boy to 
her brother. 
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Contributing to the delinquency of a minor generally requires conduct that 
causes or encourages a child to become delinquent, in need of services, or 
abused or neglected.213 Courts may be empowered to make a finding of “con-
tributing” without finding that a minor actually was delinquent, since contrib-
uting statutes may encompass conduct that not only results in delinquency, but 
also that is likely or “tends” to do so.214 
ii. Stalking and Harassment 
In some states, a petitioner might be able to show that emotionally, psycho-
logically, or financially coercive conduct amounts to stalking or criminal har-
assment.215 Criminal stalking and harassment offenses typically require proof 
that: (1) a perpetrator engaged in a course of conduct directed at the petitioner; 
(2) the conduct caused the victim to fear for her safety or to feel seriously 
alarmed, disturbed, or frightened; and (3) the perpetrator intended to make the 
victim feel that way, or should have known that his or her actions would have 
that result.216 Establishing that the conduct of an individual attempting to force 
a marriage constitutes stalking or harassment presents several significant chal-
lenges. 
First, a petitioner must prove that a respondent acted with the requisite in-
tent. Some states require proof that a respondent had a specific intent to harass; 
whereas others require intentional or knowing conduct, or the lack of a legiti-
mate purpose.217 Establishing specific intent may be particularly challenging in 
forced marriage cases involving a parent, which could require a petitioner to 
prove that the parent intended to harass or terrify the petitioner rather than to 
advance the petitioner’s best interests (as the parent understood them). Like-
wise, a petitioner could be required to prove that the parent’s attempts to coerce 
a marriage served no legitimate purpose. In such circumstances, a court might 
be required to identify the point at which a parent’s potentially legitimate pur-
pose (e.g. wanting to secure a child’s future, or guide a child toward life deci-
                                                        
213  See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.24 (West 2017). 
214  State v. Gans, 151 N.E.2d 709, 714 (Ohio 1958) (upholding parental convictions for con-
tributing to the delinquency of a minor after the defendants instructed their eleven-year-old 
daughter to misrepresent her age to a county clerk and consented to the issuance of her mar-
riage license, concluding that actively enabling a minor under the lawful age to marry tends 
to cause delinquency because her marriage was likely to cause her to become truant and en-
danger the morals of her classmates because of the “mature” knowledge and attitudes she 
will acquire as a spouse); see also Marriage or Rape?, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 15, 1996, 7:00 PM) 
(a mother was charged with contributing to the delinquency of a minor after her two thirteen 
and fourteen year-old daughters were allegedly forced to marry substantially older men; the 
father was charged with child abuse and the husbands were charged with rape). 
215  See infra APPENDIX 3; see also GOODMARK, supra note 119, at 41. 
216  See generally Aaron H. Caplan, Free Speech and Civil Harassment Orders, 64 HASTINGS 
L. J. 781 (2013); Tracey B. Carter, Local, State, and Federal Responses to Stalking: Are An-
ti-Stalking Laws Effective?, 22 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 333, 351 (2016). 
217  Caplan, supra note 216, at 796. 
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sions a parent believes beneficial) becomes illegitimate (e.g. forcing a marriage 
regardless of a child’s wishes, or forcing a marriage to the detriment of a 
child’s welfare). 
Proving that a respondent’s conduct had the requisite impact on the peti-
tioner’s own mental state presents a second significant challenge. Some states 
require a petitioner to prove that she actually feared for her safety or felt seri-
ously alarmed, disturbed, or frightened; whereas others require a petitioner to 
show that a reasonable person in her circumstances could feel the same; and 
still other states require both.218 In theory, a petitioner could attempt to satisfy 
this requirement simply by showing that she believed the respondent aimed his 
or her conduct to force her into a marriage that she did not wish to enter. The 
petitioner could allege that her fear or alarm stemmed from the consequences of 
the potential union itself, or the consequences she would face by resisting the 
marriage. Some states presume that certain types of conduct, such as creating a 
disturbance at a petitioner’s place of employment or school; repeatedly tele-
phoning, following, or keeping a petitioner under surveillance; improperly con-
cealing or threatening to remove the petitioner’s minor child from the jurisdic-
tion; or threatening physical force, confinement or restraint cause emotional 
distress.219 Petitioners also might be required to demonstrate that court action 
against particular tactics is constitutionally permitted.220 Respondents may ar-
gue that findings of stalking or harassment rooted in a respondent’s speech may 
violate the free speech guarantees of the First Amendment.221 
iii. Criminal Coercion/Restraint of Liberty 
In a minority of states, a petitioner could seek a protection order on the ba-
sis that a respondent has wrongfully coerced or restricted her liberty.222 Profes-
sors Leigh Goodmark and Margaret Johnson have noted that although such 
provisions look beyond the direct infliction of physical violence, provisions of-
ten define the relevant conduct “by reference to actual or threatened physical 
force or violence.”223 For example, to demonstrate that a respondent subjected 
her to coercion or an interference with personal liberty, a petitioner typically 
must prove that the respondent compelled the petitioner by force, threat of 
force, or intimidation “to engage in conduct from which [the petitioner] has the 
right or privilege to abstain, or to abstain from conduct in which [the petitioner] 
                                                        
218  Id. at 795; Carter, supra note 216, at 359. 
219  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103 (2018). 
220  Caplan, supra note 216, at 808–26; Carter, supra note 216, at 374–78; see also infra Sec-
tion II.C.2.d. 
221  Carter, supra note 216, at 377. 
222  Johnson, supra note 201, at 1133–34. 
223  GOODMARK, supra note 119, at 38; see also Johnson, supra note 201, at 1133–34. 
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has a right or privilege to engage.”224 Illinois further grants a cause of action to 
minor petitioners who allege that a caretaker forced them to “participate in or 
witness the physical abuse, confinement, or restraint of another,”225 and desig-
nates “knowing, repeated, and unnecessary sleep deprivation” as an actionable 
form of physical abuse.226 
iv. Emotional Abuse 
Several states also permit a petitioner to seek a protection order on the ba-
sis of emotionally abusive conduct not tied to physical violence (outside the 
realm of stalking or harassment). Actionable conduct varies by state, and in-
cludes the willful deprivation of necessities to a dependent,227 “interfering with 
[a] petitioner at petitioner’s place of employment or education or engaging in 
conduct that impairs petitioner’s employment or education[],”228 “repeatedly 
driving by a residence or workplace,”229 “creating fear of physical harm by . . . 
psychological abuse or threatening acts,”230 repeatedly telephoning or disturb-
ing the peace of the petitioner,231 and/or causing petitioner emotional distress or 
injury.232 
d. Constitutionally Protected Parental Conduct 
Across all allegations of qualifying conduct, a minor petitioner seeking to 
restrain a parent will face the added challenge of establishing that his or her 
parent’s conduct falls outside of the constitutionally protected sphere of paren-
tal decision-making and reasonable parental discipline. The guarantee of priva-
cy accorded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment conveys 
to parents the fundamental liberty interest in the care and control of their chil-
dren.233 This interest authorizes parents to make major life decisions for their 
                                                        
224  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 13-14-101 (2017); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103 (2018); 
ME. STAT. tit. 19A, § 4002 (2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 455.010 (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 33.018 (2017); N.Y. FAM. CT. LAW § 812 (McKinney 2018); N.Y. PENAL CODE § 135.60 
(Consol. 2008). 
225  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/103 (2018). 
226  Id. 
227  Id. 
228  MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2950(1), (4) (2018). 
229  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2 (2018). 
230  W. VA. CODE § 48-27-202 (2017). 
231  CAL. FAM. CODE § 6320 (West 2018). 
232  See., e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 1041(1) (2017); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-1 (2017) 
(extreme psychological abuse); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103 (2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-
13-2(D) (2018) (severe emotional distress); see also Johnson, supra note 201, at 1133–34. 
233  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000) (striking down a state law allowing third-
party petitions for child visitation rights over parental objection, holding that “[t]he liberty 
interest at issue in this case—the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their 
children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this 
Court”); see also James G. Dwyer, Parental Entitlement and Corporal Punishment, 73 J. L. 
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minor children in areas such as religion, education, and health.234 Parents are 
entitled to use reasonable forms of discipline to maintain control over their 
children and secure compliance with their directives.235 
Nonetheless, parents’ interest in controlling their children is not absolute. It 
is constrained by the state’s responsibility as parens patriae to ensure the well-
being of children236 and by the rights children themselves enjoy.237 This balance 
of competing rights and responsibilities means that, for a child to have an ac-
tionable claim against a parent, parental conduct must not only qualify under 
the relevant statute, but also be shown to exceed the bounds of constitutionally 
protected parenting. To overcome this hurdle, a petitioner would be required to 
                                                                                                                                 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 189, 210 (2010) (reasoning that the propriety of parental use of corporal 
punishment should be understood as a question of the scope of parents’ freedom or discre-
tion to use particular means of discipline in exercising their liberty interests to care and con-
trol the upbringing of their children, rather than one of a parent’s “right” to do so). 
234  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899–900 (1992) (upholding Pennsylvania’s 
abortion statute requiring parental consent and stating that the waiting period provided the 
opportunity for parental consultation to discuss the moral consequences of abortion in a fa-
milial context); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 588 & n.3, 604, 620–21 (1979) (upholding 
Georgia’s mental hospital commitment statute, which permitted parents or guardians to re-
quest that their child be committed if there was evidence of mental illness, because parental 
decisions regarding a child’s medical care should receive great deference); Pierce v. Soc’y of 
the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 530, 534–35 (1925) (finding 
a state compulsory public school attendance law to unconstitutionally infringe on parental 
authority to direct the upbringing and education of children); Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 
401 (1923) (holding that state restriction of school curricula to prohibit the teaching of 
“modern” languages other than English before the eighth grade unconstitutionally infringed 
on parents’ liberty interest in controlling “the education of their own”). 
235  Commonwealth v. Dorvil, 32 N.E.3d 861, 868–70 (Mass. 2015) (recognizing the com-
mon law parental privilege to use reasonable force in disciplining a child and evaluating its 
scope in Massachusetts and a number of other states); State v. Wilder, 748 A.2d 444, 453 
(Me. 2000) (evaluating the parental privilege to use physical means of discipline under the 
laws of Maine and numerous states); Kandice K. Johnson, Crime or Punishment: The Paren-
tal Corporal Punishment Defense—Reasonable and Necessary, or Excused Abuse?, 1998 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 413, 417 (1998) (analyzing the contours of the parental privilege to use reasona-
ble force in discipline as established by state statutes and common law and collecting rele-
vant statutes and cases). Courts and commentators have noted that although it has not direct-
ly ruled on this question, Supreme Court precedent impliedly authorizes corporal punishment 
as a potentially permissible means of carrying out parents’ authority to raise their children as 
they see fit, as it has permitted the use of corporal punishment in schools. Wilder, 748 A.2d 
at 453; Johnson, supra note 201, at 427–28. 
236  Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 
(1982); Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88. See generally Stacy Brustin & Lisa Vollendorf Martin, Paved 
with Good Intentions: Unintended Consequences of Federal Proposals to Integrate Child 
Support and Parenting Time, 48 IND. L. REV. 803, 825 (2015) (parental power balanced 
against the state’s interest through parens patriae power). 
237  “Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one at-
tains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Consti-
tution and possess constitutional rights.” Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 
(1976). See generally Homer H. Clark, Jr., Children and the Constitution, 1992 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1, 40 (collecting and summarizing constitutional cases involving children’s rights). 
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show that the parental conduct at issue was not an exercise of reasonable paren-
tal discipline to maintain control over the child, and was undertaken in further-
ance of an improper objective.238 
Depending on the circumstances, a petitioner might be able to establish that 
the relevant conduct does not qualify as reasonable parental discipline; for ex-
ample, because it involved excessive punishment.239 To show that conduct was 
undertaken in furtherance of an improper objective, petitioners could argue that 
forcing a child to enter a marriage against his or her wishes is not within the pa-
rental prerogative, and conduct undertaken to advance that end is not for a 
child’s benefit.240 
It could be argued that the laws in several states that require parental con-
sent to the marriage of a minor bring a child’s marriage within the scope of pro-
tected parental decision making.241 Such statutes permit parents to prevent chil-
dren from entering into marriages by withholding their consent to the issuance 
of a marriage license. Essentially, these statutes create a temporary parental ve-
to during a defined period of minority over marriages that parents believe to be 
harmful or unwise. Thus, the laws preserve parents’ authority to control the up-
bringing of children by permitting parents to delay a child’s marriage until the 
child reaches adulthood, and perhaps preclude the union altogether if the in-
tended spouses change their minds in the interim. These statutes do not, how-
ever, grant parents the affirmative authority to choose a child’s spouse and di-
rect a child to marry, regardless of the child’s wishes.242 
3. The Impediments of Minority 
States created civil protection orders to address violence in adult relation-
ships, and the remedy remains adult-centered.243 But most states also have 
made the remedy available to protect children from abuse in family and other 
                                                        
238  Some states explicitly exempt constitutionally protected parenting activities from other-
wise qualifying conduct. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103 (2018) (the “reasonable di-
rection of a minor child by a parent or person in loco parentis” does not give rise to an ac-
tionable claim of willful deprivation); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-2 (West 2017) (establishing 
an affirmative defense to a charge of criminal restraint that the defendant was a relative or 
legal guardian who acted to restrain an unemancipated minor solely to control the child). 
239  Johnson, supra note 235, at 467–69. 
240  Id.; see also sources cited supra note 13. 
241  Understanding State Statutes on Minimum Marriage Age and Exceptions, supra note 6. 
242  Id. 
243  Martin, supra note 105, at 467, 487; see also Stacy L. Brustin, Legal Responses to Teen 
Dating Violence, 29 FAM. L. Q. 331, 339 (1995); Roger J.R. Levesque, Dating Violence, Ad-
olescents, and the Law, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 339, 342–43 (1997); Pamela Saperstein, 
Teen Dating Violence: Eliminating Statutory Barriers to Civil Protection Orders, 39 FAM. L. 
Q. 181, 183 (2005) (noting that the issue of violence in teen dating relationships was not a 
concern when states started to enact domestic violence statutes). 
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relationships.244 In recognition of children’s age, immaturity, lack of experi-
ence, relative helplessness, and reliance on family members and others to pro-
tect them, the law accords children “minority” status to protect their interests.245 
States limit children’s legal rights and children’s ability to control their legal 
affairs until they reach the age of legal majority.246 Because state law deter-
mines the ages at which minors assume various rights and duties, these ages of-
ten vary by jurisdiction.247 Children can be “emancipated” from the restrictions 
of minority upon the occurrence of certain life events, such as marriage or en-
listment in the military, or by court order.248 Yet, emancipation alone does not 
automatically confer to minors all the legal rights and protections accorded to 
adults.249 Consequently, emancipated minors may not be viewed as adult parties 
when seeking civil protection orders. Whether minors can seek protection or-
ders to prevent a forced marriage depends on whether and how states grant mi-
nors standing as protected parties and define minors’ legal capacity to advance 
their own claims.250 
a. Standing 
The accessibility of civil protection orders to minors first depends on 
whether a jurisdiction accords them standing—the right to seek legal relief.251 
A number of states expressly grant standing to some or all minors. Of these, 
some explicitly grant standing to minors of any age that is coextensive with the 
standing granted to adults,252 whereas others grant standing only to minors 
                                                        
244  See infra Section III.C.3.b. 
245  KRAMER, supra note 24, § 1:1, at 6. 
246  Age of Majority, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 70 (9th ed. 2009); NATIONAL SURVEY OF 
STATE LAWS 522–25 (Richard A. Leiter ed., 7th ed. 2015) (compiling state statutes regarding 
emancipation and ages of majority). 
247  KRAMER, supra note 24, § 14:2, at 982 (citing Valley Nat’l Bank v. Glover, 159 P.2d 292 
(Ariz. 1945); Jacobsen v. Lenhart, 195 N.E.2d 638, 640 (Ill. 1964); Zelnick v. Adams, 606 
S.E.2d 843, 846 (Va. 2005)) (indicating the legislature’s authority to establish the age of ma-
jority). 
248  Martin, supra note 105, at 476. 
249  See Wickham v. Torley, 71 S.E. 881, 882 (Ga. 1911) (“[E]ven emancipation of the minor 
from parental control . . . does not remove his disability and clothe him with the power to 
contract.”); Wuller v. Chuse Grocery Co., 89 N.E. 796, 797 (Ill. 1909) (“[T]he contract of an 
infant is, in general, voidable by him, and gains no additional force from the fact that he is 
engaged in business for himself or is emancipated.”); Merrick v. Stephens, 337 S.W.2d 713, 
719 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960) (finding no authority for the proposition that “solely because of 
emancipation, the infant is sui juris for all purposes”). 
250  Martin, supra note 105, at 469–70. 
251  Standing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1536 (9th ed. 2009). 
252  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(3), (5) (2017); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 
§ 372(b)(1)(C) (West 2018); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6301(a) (West 2018); D.C. CODE § 16-
1003(a)(1)–(5) (2018); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(a) (2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, 
§§ 60.1.1, 60.1.4, 60.2A (2017). Tennessee explicitly grants minors standing to seek protec-
tion orders based on the same qualifying relationships available to adults but does not speci-
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within a certain age group or those who share a particular relationship with the 
respondent.253 Consequently, a number of states clearly accord at least some 
minors standing to seek protection orders against parents,254 other relatives,255 
individuals who are stalking or harassing them,256 and sexual assailants.257 Mi-
nors also have standing to seek a protection order against an intended spouse in 
some states if the minor shows that the respondent qualifies as a fiancé258 or da-
ting partner.259 
For several reasons, minors arguably also have standing to seek protection 
orders in states with statutes that are ambiguous or silent on the issue.260 First, 
absent a statute or constitutional provision to the contrary, children generally 
have the same rights to legal protection and redress for wrongs as adults.261 Se-
                                                                                                                                 
fy whether minors have standing to seek protection orders against sexual assailants or stalk-
ers. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601(5) (2017). 
253  See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 236.2 (2017) (granting minors standing against spouses, intimate 
partner cohabitants, and dating partners); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 455.010(2), (7) (2017) (restrict-
ing civil protection orders to adults and defining adult as an individual aged seventeen and 
older); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.726 (2018) (granting standing to minor spouses and minors in 
sexually intimate relationships if the respondent is eighteen years of age or older); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 35-21-102(a) (2017) (defining “adult” to include any person who is either at 
least sixteen years old or legally married); D.M.H. ex rel. Hefel v. Thompson, 577 N.W.2d 
643, 646 (Iowa 1998). 
254  See infra APPENDIX 4. 
255  See infra APPENDIX 4. 
256  See infra APPENDIX 4. 
257  See infra APPENDIX 4. 
258  See infra APPENDIX 4. 
259  See infra APPENDIX 4. 
260  Courts in several states have interpreted ambiguous protection order statutes to extend 
standing to minors. See D.M.H. ex rel. Hefel, 577 N.W.2d at 646; Beermann v. Beermann, 
559 N.W.2d 868, 869–70, 874 (S.D. 1997); Katherine B.T. v. Jackson, 640 S.E.2d 569, 576 
(W. Va. 2006). 
261  Sorenson v. Sorenson, 339 N.E.2d 907, 912 (Mass. 1975); see also Petersen v. City & 
Cty. of Honolulu, 462 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Haw. 1969) (“[I]n general, minor children are enti-
tled to the same redress for wrongs done them as are any other persons.”) (citing Dunlap v. 
Dunlap, 150 A. 905, 906 (N.H. 1930)); Wilbon v. D.F. Bast Co., 382 N.E.2d 784, 790–91 
(Ill. 1978) (“[A] minor should not be precluded from enforcing his rights unless clearly de-
barred from so doing by some statute or constitutional provision.”) (citing Walgreen Co. v. 
Indus. Comm’n, 153 N.E. 831, 833 (Ill. 1926)); Norris v. Mingle, 29 N.E.2d 400, 402 (Ind. 
1940) (“[A] minor should not be precluded from enforcing his rights unless the same are 
clearly barred on account of some statutory or constitutional provision.”); Gillette v. Del. L. 
& W.R. Co., 102 A. 673, 673 (N.J. 1917) (holding that an infant’s minority does not prevent 
him from initiating suit to redress legal claims); Henry ex rel. Henry v. City of N.Y., 724 
N.E.2d 372, 374 (N.Y. 1999) (“[A]n infant’s right of action ‘at its origination is and remains 
in the infant. . . . Infancy does not incapacitate the infant from bringing the action.’ ”) (quot-
ing Murphy v. Vill. of Fort Edward, 107 N.E. 716, 717 (N.Y. 1915)); Harrison v. Wallton’s 
Ex’r, 30 S.E. 372, 373 (Va. 1898) (holding that minors can bring suit through adult repre-
sentatives to enforce their rights during their minority); Hunter v. N. Mason High Sch., 529 
P.2d 898, 899 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (“The legal disabilities of minors have been firmly es-
tablished by common law and statute. They were established for the protection of minors, 
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cond, constitutional provisions and statutes in several states explicitly guarantee 
to minors a general right to access the courts for redress of grievances.262 Third, 
by establishing the procedures to be followed when courts are presented with 
claims by minor parties who lack legal capacity to sue, court rules in many 
states manifest a presumption that individuals of any age are entitled to pursue 
legal claims.263 Furthermore, because protection order statutes are remedial in 
nature, the principle of liberal construction dictates that courts should construe 
such statutes liberally to benefit the class of individuals that the statutes were 
intended to protect.264 Applying this principle, courts faced with a choice be-
                                                                                                                                 
and not as a bar to the enforcement of their rights.”) (citing 43 C.J.S. Infants § 19 (1945)), 
aff’d, 539 P.2d 845 (Wash. 1975); Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721, 722–23 (W. Va. 1976) 
(“We perceive no reason why minor children should not enjoy the same right to legal redress 
for wrongs done to them as others enjoy.”). 
262  Sara Jeruss, Empty Promises? How State Procedural Rules Block LGBT Minors from 
Vindicating Their Substantive Rights, 43 U. S.F. L. REV. 853, 905–09 tbl.1 (2009) (compil-
ing state constitutional provisions and statutes according minors a right of access to the 
courts). 
263  Alison M. Brumley, Comment, Parental Control of a Minor’s Right to Sue in Federal 
Court, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 333, 356 (1991) (“Congress designed [Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure] Rule 17(c) to promote and protect the ability of minor plaintiffs and defendants to 
pursue their legal interests with such guidance as the trial court deems necessary in the best 
interests of the minor. The rule reflects a belief that minors as well as adults should have ac-
cess to the courts to protect their legal rights.”); Jeruss, supra note 262, at 872–73, 910–34 
tbl.2 (detailing the laws and court rules addressing minors’ legal capacity in the fifty states 
and noting that nearly all states have incorporated Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure into their statutes, or contain a similar rule requiring that a guardian or next friend 
appear on behalf of minors). 
264  See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/102 (2018) (“This Act shall be liberally construed and 
applied to promote its underlying purposes. . . .”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.11 (West 2017) 
(“Remedial laws and all proceedings under them shall be liberally construed in order to pro-
mote their object and assist the parties in obtaining justice.”); W. VA. CODE § 48-27-101(b) 
(2017) (“This article shall be liberally construed and applied to promote the following pur-
poses: (1) To assure victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse that 
the law can provide. . . ”); Salvattera v. Ramirez, 105 A.3d 1003, 1010 (D.C. 2014) (“ ‘the 
plain intent of the legislature was an expansive reading of the Act’; it ‘must be liberally con-
strued in furtherance of its remedial purpose.’ ”) (quoting Araya v. Keleta, 31 A.3d 78, 81 
(D.C. 2011)); Rinas v. Engelhardt, 818 N.W.2d 767, 772 (N.D. 2012) (“As a remedial stat-
ute, [the statute] is to be construed liberally to allow courts to accomplish the goal of protec-
tion orders, which is protecting victims of domestic violence from further harm”); Saville v. 
Ude, 776 N.W.2d 31, 35 (N.D. 2009) (“As a remedial statute, the provisions of § 14–07.1–
02 are construed liberally, allowing the courts to accomplish the objectives behind protection 
orders.”); Raynes v. Rogers, 955 A.2d 1135, 1140 (Vt. 2008) (as a remedial statute, Ver-
mont’s Abuse Prevention Act “must be liberally construed to ‘suppress the evil and advance 
the remedy intended by the Legislature.’ ”) (quoting Dep’t of Corr. v. Human Rights 
Comm’n, 917 A.2d 451, 454 (Vt. 2006)); Swensen v. Swensen, 490 N.W.2d 668, 670 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1992) (“As a remedial statute, the Domestic Abuse Act receives liberal construction 
. . . in favor of an injured person.”); N.J. DIV. CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STUDENT MANUAL 2-1 (2003) (“The provisions of the domestic vio-
lence laws should be liberally construed by the law enforcement officer in favor of action 
protecting a victim of domestic violence,” referencing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19). 
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tween alternate interpretations of protection order statutes should select those 
that provide the greatest protection for victims of abuse.265 Finally, public poli-
cy supports extending standing to all individuals, regardless of age, when the 
law is silent to instill confidence in the legal system and to encourage those 
who need help to seek it.266 For all of these reasons, where protection order 
statutes are ambiguous, minors should be presumed to have the same standing 
to seek relief as adults. 
Minors clearly lack standing to seek domestic violence civil protection or-
ders under any circumstances in at least one state,267 and lack standing to file 
against parents268 or other relatives269 in several others. Emancipated minors are 
treated differently across states. Whereas several states explicitly confer stand-
ing on emancipated minors as adults,270 at least one state explicitly treat some 
emancipated minors as minors for purposes of the protection order remedy.271 
Several states explicitly grant standing to adults to seek protection orders 
on minors’ behalf. Some do so restrictively, granting standing only to adults 
who share a particular relationship with a minor, including parents, guardians, 
and custodians;272 family or household members;273 or those who play a particu-
                                                        
265  See, e.g., Katherine B.T., 640 S.E.2d at 576 (finding that minors have standing to seek 
protection orders as “persons” based, in part, on the principle of liberal construction codified 
within the statute). 
266  Buckholz v. Leveille, 194 N.W.2d 427, 427 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (“Courts must stand 
prepared to protect the rights of all citizens, including teenagers. Denying a teen-aged liti-
gant access to our courts simply because he happens to be a minor not only tends to lessen 
the confidence of young people in our legal system but adds credence to the existence of the 
‘generation gap.’ And it may even help widen that gap.”); see Martin, supra note 105, at 
514–15. 
267  WIS. STAT. § 813.12(1)(am) (2017) (defining “domestic abuse” as only being perpetrated 
by and against “adult[s]”). Minors do have standing to seek protection orders against sexual 
assault and stalking in Wisconsin. WIS. STAT. § 813.125(2)(b) (2017); see also MO. REV. 
STAT. § 455.010(2), (7) (2017) (restricting civil protection orders to adults and defining adult 
as an individual aged seventeen and older); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-102(a) (2017) (defin-
ing “adult” to include any person who is either at least sixteen years old or legally married). 
268  See infra APPENDIX 4. 
269  See infra APPENDIX 4. 
270  See ALA. CODE § 30-5-5(a)(1) (2017); ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 4002(2) (2017); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 93-21-3(b) (2017) (emancipation by marriage); MO. REV. STAT. § 455.010(2) (2017); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19(a), (d), (e) (West 2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 60.1(1) (2017); 8 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.1-1(1), (3) (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601(2) (2017). 
271  ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-201(d) (2017) (married minors). 
272  See infra APPENDIX 5. The Vermont Supreme Court interpreted its statute to confer stand-
ing only to parents to seek protection orders on behalf of minors. See Wood ex rel. Eddy v. 
Eddy, 833 A.2d 1243, 1245 (Vt. 2003) (agreeing that a mother had standing to seek a protec-
tion order on behalf of her minor daughter); Bigelow v. Bigelow, 721 A.2d 98, 100 (Vt. 
1998) (holding that the statute “does not encompass petitions by third parties, even grand-
parents, on behalf of minor children.”). 
273  See infra APPENDIX 5. 
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lar professional role, such as district attorneys,274 domestic violence program or 
shelter staff and volunteers,275 guardians ad litem,276 or representatives of state 
agencies.277 Other states permit a broader array of adults to represent minors’ 
interests.278 More restrictive definitions of qualifying adults may present barri-
ers in the forced marriage context, as minor petitioners may be seeking to re-
strain the very adults upon whom they must rely to advance claims for protec-
tion. 
b. Capacity 
The accessibility of protection orders for minors depends not only on 
whether minors have standing to sue, but also on whether they have the legal 
capacity to represent their own interests in the litigation. Capacity is a party’s 
“satisfaction of a legal qualification, such as legal age or soundness of mind, 
that determines one’s ability to sue or be sued.”279 Minors generally lack the 
capacity to take civil legal action independently; instead, they typically must 
advance legal claims through an adult representative.280 
Concerns about the prevalence of dating violence and sexual assault vic-
timization among teens, coupled with data showing teens’ reluctance to dis-
close such abuse to adults, have led several states to depart from this general 
rule and grant adolescents the legal capacity to seek protection orders inde-
pendently.281 Several states grant capacity to seek protection orders to all mi-
nors who have reached a minimum age282 and/or share a particular relationship 
with the respondent.283 Other states require courts to assess capacity on a case-
                                                        
274  See infra APPENDIX 5. 
275  See infra APPENDIX 5. 
276  See infra APPENDIX 5. 
277  See infra APPENDIX 5. 
278  See infra APPENDIX 5. 
279  Capacity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
280  2 THOMAS A. JACOBS, CHILDREN AND THE LAW: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS § 11:13 
(2012) (unemancipated minors generally do not have capacity to sue); 4 JAMES WM. 
MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 17.21[3][a] & n.16 (3d ed. 2014); Linda D. Elrod, 
Client-Directed Lawyers for Children: It Is the “Right” Thing to Do, 27 PACE L. REV. 869, 
878–79 (2007) (providing a historical overview of children’s legal rights). 
281  See infra APPENDIX 5. 
282  Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 372(b)(1)(C)–(D) (West 2018); CAL. FAM. CODE 
§ 6301(a) (West 2018) (granting minors twelve and older capacity to seek protection orders 
on their own against any qualifying respondent), with MO. REV. STAT. §§ 455.010(2), 
455.020 (2016) (minors seventeen and older can seek protection orders on their own against 
any qualifying respondent). 
283  Compare D.C. CODE § 16-1003(a)(2)–(3) (2018) (granting minors twelve and older ca-
pacity to seek protection orders against intimate partners, and minors 16 and older against 
any qualifying respondent), with TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 82.002(b)(1) (West 2017) (grant-
ing minors of any age capacity to seek protection orders against dating partners). 
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by-case basis.284 When a minor appears in court with no adult representative to 
seek a protection order, states authorize courts to take varying steps to protect 
the minor’s interests, including appointment of an attorney285 or a guardian ad 
litem.286 
On the other end of the spectrum, a handful of states make clear that mi-
nors lack capacity to proceed independently in protection order proceedings, 
and authorize certain adults to represent minor petitioners’ interests.287 At least 
one state deprives otherwise emancipated minors of capacity in protection order 
proceedings.288 
Most protection order statutes are silent or ambiguous regarding minors’ 
capacity to represent their own interests.289 In such jurisdictions, statutes, case 
law, and court rules governing capacity often permit courts to determine what 
is needed to protect the minor’s interests in the litigation.290 Courts in states that 
                                                        
284  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 13-3602(A) (2017) (parents, guardians, and custodians 
generally must file petitions for minor victims “unless the court determines otherwise”); 
MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(4)(a) (2017) (minors sixteen and older can be granted capacity to 
seek protection orders on their own against spouses or co-parents “if the court determines 
that the minor has sufficient maturity and judgment and that it is in the best interests of the 
minor”). 
285  See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1005(a-1)(4) (2018) (court may appoint an attorney to repre-
sent the interests of a minor who appears without an adult representative if such appointment 
will not unduly delay adjudication of the case). 
286  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 372(b)(1) (West 2018) (a court may appoint a guardian ad litem, 
after considering any objections by the minor petitioner to the appointment of particular in-
dividuals and if the appointment will not unduly delay adjudication of the case). 
287  See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 30-5-2(4), 30-5-5(a)(1)–(2) (2017) (providing that only adults 
may seek protection orders, and permitting protection orders to be filed by plaintiffs or by 
parents, guardians, custodians, or the State Department of Human Resources on behalf of 
minors); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-201(d)(2), (4) (2017) (requiring protection orders to be 
filed on behalf of minors by adult family or household members or by people working for 
domestic violence shelters and programs); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-3(a) (2017) (“A person 
who is not a minor may seek relief under this article by filing a petition with the superior 
court alleging one or more acts of family violence. A person who is not a minor may also 
seek relief on behalf of a minor by filing such a petition.”); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:2133(D) 
(2017) (“An adult may seek relief under this Part by filing a petition with the court alleging 
abuse by the defendant. Any parent, adult household member, or district attorney may seek 
relief on behalf of any minor child. . . .”); ME. STAT. tit. 19-a, § 4005(1) (2017) (permitting 
only adults responsible for a minor or the department of child and family services to seek a 
protection order on behalf of a minor); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6106(a) (2018) (“An adult or an 
emancipated minor may seek relief under this chapter for that person or any parent, adult 
household member, or guardian ad litem may seek relief under this chapter on behalf of mi-
nor children . . . by filing a petition with the court alleging abuse by the defendant.”). 
288  See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-201(d)(2), (4) (2017) (classifying married minors as minors 
for capacity purposes). 
289  Martin, supra note 105, at 483. 
290  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 372(b)(1) (West 2018); MICH. CT. R. 3.703(F)(1) 
(providing that minor petitioners in protection order proceedings must proceed through next 
friends, who must be adults not statutorily disqualified from service. Next friends are author-
ized to serve without court appointment where a minor is fourteen or older); Parrish v. Price, 
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follow Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) have the discretion to appoint a 
next friend, guardian ad litem, or make any other order ensuring a minor’s in-
terests are adequately protected, including permitting a minor to proceed 
alone.291 Courts do not have this latitude in all states, and a number of states re-
quire courts to appoint adults to represent the interests of minor parties in all 
                                                                                                                                 
71 So. 3d 132, 133 (Fla. Ct. App. 2011) (holding minors have standing to seek domestic vio-
lence injunctions but lack capacity to do so on their own; they must have an appointed repre-
sentative or a next friend); Beermann v. Beermann, 559 N.W.2d 868, 870–71 (S.D. 1997) 
(holding where a minor seeks a civil protection order without an adult representative, trial 
courts have the discretion to appoint a guardian ad litem or conclude that no guardian is nec-
essary and permit the minor to proceed alone). Judicial benchbooks in some states provide 
guidance to courts regarding capacity where statutes are ambiguous. See, e.g., Colo. Domes-
tic Violence Benchbook, Ch. 2, at 2-3 (2014) (protection orders may be sought to protect 
minors if action is brought through a person empowered to act on the minor’s behalf); 
COMMONWEALTH OF MA. TRIAL COURT GUIDELINES FOR JUDICIAL PRACTICE: ABUSE 
PREVENTION PROCEEDING 19 (2011), http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/209a/guidelines-
2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JZU-S7DJ]. (“The court should not refuse to act solely because 
the court cannot secure the presence of a parent or guardian, particularly where the minor is 
mature (16 or 17), and where the defendant is an intimate partner or a family member who is 
not a parent or guardian or where there is an imminent threat of bodily injury.”). An attorney 
general opinion addresses this issue in Virginia, Op. Att’y Gen. 10-116, at 1,4 (2011) (opin-
ing that only emancipated minors have capacity to file a petition for a protection orders 
without an adult representative; minors may appear before a magistrate to seek an emergen-
cy temporary protection order on their own). 
291  See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-17(c) (19857); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
217(c) (West 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2017(c) (West 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 15-6-17(c) (2017); ALA. R. CIV. P. 17(c); ALASKA R. CIV. P. 17(c); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 17(f); 
COLO. R. CIV. P. 17(c); DEL. SUP. CT. R. CIV. P. 17(c); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.210(b); HAW. R. CIV. 
P. 17(c); IDAHO R. CIV. P. 17(c); ME. R. CIV. P. 17(b); MASS. R. CIV. P. 17(b); MISS. R. CIV. 
P. 17(c); MONT. R. CIV. P. 17(c); NEV. R. CIV. P. 17(c); N.M. DIST. CT. R. CIV. P. 1-017(d); 
N.D. R. CIV. P. 17(b); OHIO R. CIV. P. 17(B); S.C. R. CIV. P. 17(c); TENN. R. CIV. P. 17.03; 
VT. R. CIV. P. 17(b); WYO. R. CIV. P. 17(c); Gardner ex rel. Gardner v. Parson, 874 F.2d 
131, 140 (3d Cir. 1989) (“under Rule 17(c), a court may appoint a guardian, or it may de-
cline to do so if the child’s interests may be protected in an alternative manner.”); M.S. v. 
Wermers, 557 F.2d 170, 174 (8th Cir. 1977) (stating the “[a]ppointment of a guardian ad li-
tem is considered to be discretionary under the Federal Rules, provided the District Court 
enters a finding that the interests of the minor are adequately protected in the event it does 
not make such appointment.”); Roberts v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 35, 39 (5th Cir. 
1958) (“We spell out the [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c)] to mean: (1) as a matter of 
proper procedure, the court should usually appoint a guardian ad litem; (2) but the [c]ourt 
may, after weighing all the circumstances, issue such order as will protect the minor in lieu 
of appointment of a guardian ad litem; (3) and may even decide that such appointment is un-
necessary, though only after the [c]ourt has considered the matter and made a judicial deter-
mination that the infant is protected without a guardian.”); see also Beermann, 559 N.W.2d 
at 870–71 (holding that where a minor seeks a civil protection order without an adult repre-
sentative, trial courts have the discretion to appoint a guardian ad litem or conclude that no 
guardian is necessary and permit the minor to proceed alone). But see Katherine B.T v. Jack-
son, 640 S.E.2d 569, 577 (W.Va. 2006) (holding that West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 
17(c) requires that “a minor must have either a next friend or guardian in order to prosecute 
or defend civil actions generally.”). See also Jeruss, supra note 262, at 875–78, 905–09 
(comparing state procedural rules to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c)). 
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proceedings.292 Several states permit minors aged fourteen and older to select 
their adult representatives, subject to court approval.293 
Given the limited data on forced marriage in the United States and the lim-
ited experience of domestic violence agencies with forced marriage cases, the 
extent to which minors seeking to avoid forced marriages would benefit by ex-
tensions of capacity is unclear. States often have extended legal capacity to mi-
nors in protection order proceedings to encourage minors to seek help by elimi-
nating the need for minors to first disclose abuse to parents or other adults.294 
It is possible that minors facing marriages forced by their parents might 
seek the support of another adult before pursuing legal protection. In such cir-
cumstances, statutory provisions limiting the adults who can assist minors to 
file for protection orders may create a significant obstacle.295 Conversely, it is 
possible that minors concerned about protecting their families from scrutiny or 
gossip might be willing to proceed only if they do not need to recruit an adult 
representative. Research on the needs and desires of minors who could benefit 
from civil injunctive relief to prevent forced marriage is sorely needed to in-
form states as they consider policies to address this issue. 
4. Remedies 
Protection orders offer a wide range of remedies for protected parties and 
provide courts flexibility in crafting individually tailored relief.296 Civil protec-
tion order statutes typically include an enumerated list of potential remedies 
that address common problems within the domestic violence context. Such lists 
often include: prohibitions on assaulting, harassing, threatening, or stalking the 
petitioner; stay-away and no-contact orders; orders to vacate a joint residence; 
temporary custody and support awards; mandated domestic violence or sub-
stance abuse counseling; monetary awards; and temporary possession of auto-
                                                        
292  See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 507.110 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-307 (2017); N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. 1201 (McKinney 2018); WIS. STAT. § 803.01(3)(a) (2017); ARK. R. CIV. P. 17(b); 
IOWA R. CIV. P. 1.210; KY. R. CIV. P. 17.03(1)-(2); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 683(D) 
(2017); MICH. CT. R. 2.201(E); MINN. R. CIV. P. 17.02; OR. R. CIV. P. 27(A); PA. R. CIV. P. 
2027; UTAH R. CIV. P. 17(b). 
293  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5203 (2017); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 373(a)–(c) 
(West 2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-5-301(1)–(2) (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. § 12.050(1)–(2) 
(2017); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1202(a)(1) (McKinney 2018); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-03-01 (2017); 
WASH. REV. CODE. § 4.08.050(1)–(2) (2017); WIS. STAT. § 803.01(b)(2)–(3) (2017); ALA. R. 
CIV. P. 17(d); MICH. CT. R. 2.201(E)(2); MINN. R. CIV. P. 17.02; OR. R. CIV. P. 27(B)(1)(a)–
(B)(2)(b); S.C. R. CIV. P. 17(d)(3); UTAH R. CIV. P. 17(c)(1). 
294  Martin, supra note 105, at 462–63. 
295  Tennessee, for example, permits unemancipated minors to file petitions for protection 
orders against a parent only if the petition is signed by another parent or legal guardian. 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-602(b) (2017) (permitting unemancipated minors to file petitions 
signed by caseworkers against other parties, but only petitions signed by a parent or legal 
guardian against a parent or legal guardian). 
296  E.g., GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 79. 
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mobiles and other personal property.297 In addition to these enumerated reme-
dies, many states also authorize courts to award “catch-all” relief—any other 
(constitutionally permissible) orders appropriate to the resolution of the case.298 
Because enumerated remedies were not crafted with forced marriage in 
mind, they may not be sufficient to meet the needs of petitioners seeking pro-
tection in this context, and may not provide courts with a reliable guide to meet 
common areas of need. As a result, catch-all provisions may best enable courts 
to craft remedies targeted to meet the specific needs of petitioners facing forced 
marriage. In the states lacking provisions for catch-all relief, protection orders 
may have more limited utility to prevent forced marriage, particularly for peti-
tioners who wish to continue to live or remain in close contact with their fami-
lies.299 
D. The Efficacy of Civil Protection Orders to Prevent Forced Marriage 
Despite the challenges identified, civil protection orders show promise as a 
remedy to prevent forced marriage. Indeed, because forced marriage is a type 
of domestic abuse and gender-based violence, it is natural that individuals 
would turn to civil protection orders to address this problem.300 Like individuals 
facing other forms of domestic and family violence, those facing forced mar-
riage often need emergency intervention, low barriers to entering the civil jus-
tice system, and individually tailored solutions.301 Moreover, those facing 
forced marriages often have close and ongoing relationships with the individu-
als from whom they need protection. The resulting emotional dynamics, the 
tactics used by respondents, and the underlying dynamic of control all should 
be familiar to courts accustomed to adjudicating petitions for protection orders 
in cases of domestic and family violence. 
Nonetheless, because civil protection orders were not created with forced 
marriage in mind, it is unsurprising that the fit between protection orders and 
                                                        
297  CAL. FAM. CODE § 6220 (West 2018); D.C. CODE § 16-1005(c) (2018); Hart, supra note 
116, at 15; Johnson, supra note 201, at 1111; Klein & Orloff, supra note 115, at 913–14, 
916–18, 925, 931–32, 937–38, 944, 954, 999; Stoever, supra note 111, at 1044. When first 
enacted, protection order remedies often were limited to directives to stay away from and 
refrain from further assaulting, harassing, or threatening a petitioner. States have amended 
protection order laws since that time to expand available remedies to address other pressing 
concerns faced by individuals subjected to abuse. GOODMARK, supra note 119, at 17. 
298  The District of Columbia, for example, permits the Court to direct the Respondent “to 
perform or refrain from other actions as may be appropriate to the effective resolution of the 
matter.” D.C. CODE § 16-1005(11) (2018); Klein & Orloff, supra note 115, at 912; see also 
A.B.A. COMM’N ON DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CIVIL 
PROTECTION ORDERS (CPOS) (2016) (collecting state protection order provisions regarding 
catch-all relief). 
299  VIGIL, REPORT TO THE HOUSE, supra note 7, at 6. 
300  See supra Section II.B. 
301  See supra Part I and Section II.B. 
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forced marriage is awkward at best. Today, the availability of civil protection 
order to prevent an impending forced marriage depends not on whether a peti-
tioner legitimately fears that she will be forced to marry against her will, but 
rather on her age, her relationship with those attempting to coerce her, whether 
the tactics used against her qualify as criminal acts, whether a qualifying adult 
is required and willing to assist her, and whether available remedies address her 
concerns. 
The terms under which protection orders are available to prevent or inter-
vene in a forced marriage vary considerably between states. Generally speak-
ing, protection orders are most likely to be available to individuals who are sub-
jected to acts or threats of physical violence by parents, relatives, household 
members, or spouses. This group most closely overlaps with petitioners seeking 
relief from domestic abuse outside of the forced marriage context. Significant 
gaps in relief exist for individuals facing or trapped in forced marriages who 
are subjected to nonviolent forms of coercion and for minors who feel unable to 
confide in an adult who would be qualified to seek relief on their behalf. Yet, 
even these groups are clearly eligible to seek relief in several states. 
So long as forced marriage-based protection order claims must be shoe-
horned into these constructs, the actual availability of protection orders to pre-
vent and intervene in forced marriages will remain uncertain. Access will de-
pend foremost on whether those facing forced marriages have the support of 
experts who understand and can inform them about the remedy and assist them 
through the process. 
III. RESTRAINING FORCED MARRIAGE 
Although civil protection orders can be used to prevent forced marriage in 
many circumstances, the complexities of doing so undermine the viability of 
the remedy as a widely accessible tool. Because individuals facing forced mar-
riages often experience numerous pressures to submit, stay silent, and not dis-
honor their families, it is especially important that legal remedies are structured 
to encourage potential victims to seek help.302 To ensure that potential victims 
can reliably access civil legal protection to prevent forced marriage, states 
should create a new remedy specifically tailored to address this problem. Many 
of the shortcomings of civil protection order statutes in the forced marriage 
context have been identified as undermining the efficacy of the remedy to re-
dress domestic violence as well.303 The creation of forced marriage protection 
orders presents an opportunity to implement reforms on a smaller scale that al-
so could be adopted in the broader civil protection order context. This section 
addresses the benefits and possible criticisms of these proposed reforms. 
                                                        
302  VIGIL, REPORT TO THE HOUSE, supra note 7, at 8. 
303  GOODMARK, supra note 119, at 45; Johnson, supra note 201, at 1111; GOODMAN & 
EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 77. 
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A. Specialization 
To redress the challenges posed to potential forced marriage victims under 
existing civil protection order statutes, lawmakers could reform those statutes, 
or, alternatively, create a new injunctive remedy specifically designed to pre-
vent and redress forced marriage. The United Kingdom took this approach 
when it created forced marriage protection orders (FMPOs) in 2007. Establish-
ing FMPOs in the United States would bring several benefits less easily 
achieved through the reform of existing protection order laws, including: align-
ing the remedy with the lived experiences of potential victims; informing po-
tential victims, advocates, and other support persons that legal protection is 
available; and communicating the state’s opprobrium of the practice and sup-
port for potential victims. To achieve these goals, FMPOs should be defined 
according to, and offer relief tailored to, the experiences of individual petition-
ers. 
1. A Model for Reform 
The United Kingdom enacted the Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 
2007.304 Under this Act, individuals are eligible to seek Forced Marriage Pro-
tection Orders (FMPOs) if they are being forced, facing attempts to be forced, 
or have been forced into a marriage.305 “Force” includes threats and psycholog-
ical coercion, and orders can be issued based on conduct that occurred within 
the U.K. or abroad.306 Individuals seeking to be protected can apply for FMPOs 
on their own behalf, and designated government agencies and other individuals 
granted leave of court also can apply for FMPOs on behalf of another individu-
al.307 Minors may represent their own interests in FMPO proceedings if they 
appear with a legal representative or if the court agrees, or, alternatively, may 
have a next friend represent their interests.308 Forced Marriage Protection Or-
ders can restrain not only respondents directly attempting to force a marriage, 
but also others who assist, counsel, encourage, or conspire with the respond-
ent.309 In determining whether to issue an FMPO, the court must consider all 
relevant circumstances, including “the need to secure the health, safety and 
                                                        
304  Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007, c. 20, (U.K.) http://www.legislation.go 
v.uk/ukpga/2007/20/pdfs/ukpga_20070020_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/GTT8-PMKV]. 
305  Id. § 63A(1)(a)–(b). 
306  Id. § 63A(6). 
307  Id. § 63C(1)–(3). 
308  Forced Marriage Protection Orders: How Can They Protect Me?, HM COURTS & 
TRIBUNAL SERVICE FL701, at 2 (Apr. 2017), https://formfinder.hmctsformfinder.justice.g 
ov.uk/fl701-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6RZ-DBRH] [hereinafter How Can They Protect 
Me?]. 
309  Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007, c. 20, 63B(3)(a), (U.K.) 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/20/pdfs/ukpga_20070020_en.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/GTT8-PMKV]. 
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well-being of the person to be protected.”310 In assessing the petitioner’s well-
being, the court must consider the expressed wishes of the person to be protect-
ed, as appropriate given the petitioner’s age and level of understanding.311 
Courts may include within the terms of FMPOs “such prohibitions, restrictions 
or requirements . . . and . . . such other terms . . . as the court considers appro-
priate for the purposes of the order.”312 Common FMPO provisions include 
prohibitions against facilitating, organizing, or permitting a marriage ceremony 
to occur, and against applying for or using a passport to remove the petitioner 
from the United Kingdom. Forced Marriage Protection Orders also can include 
protections for third parties at risk of harm from one or more respondents, such 
as a petitioner’s current or former dating partner.313 Although FMPOs may be 
enforced through civil contempt or criminal prosecution,314 enforcement pro-
ceedings have been exceedingly rare.315 
Enacting a version of FMPOs across the United States would have several 
potential benefits for those facing forced marriages. 
2. Forced Marriage as the Relationship 
Forced marriage is a form of violence worthy of legal protection regardless 
of the identity of the perpetrator. Unlike domestic violence, which is often an 
ongoing campaign by one intimate partner or family member to control anoth-
er, forced marriage can be a group effort. This group can include central per-
sons in a petitioner’s life, such as parents and close relatives, as well as ac-
quaintances and individuals a petitioner does not know well, such as an 
intended spouse’s relatives. Moreover, like sexual assault and stalking, forced 
marriage is a form of violence against women that both stems from and pro-
motes the subordination of women and girls.316 Preventing and redressing 
forced marriage in all contexts elevates the status of women and girls, and pro-
motes equality.317 For all of these reasons, making FMPOs available against 
                                                        
310  Id. § 63A(2). 
311  Id. § 63C(4)(c). 
312  Id. § 63B(1). 
313  Id. § 63B(3); see also Anne-Marie Hutchinson, Lessons for the US from UK Experiences 
with Forced Marriage Protection Orders and Abusive Transnational Marriages, TAHIRIH 
JUST. CENTER,(2013), http://preventforcedmarriage.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Less 
ons-from-the-UK-on-FMPOs-and-Abusive-Intl-Marriages-with-Anne-Marie-Hutchinson.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NM3T-QBSA]. 
314  How Can They Protect Me?, supra note 308; Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing 
Act 2014, c. 12, § 63C(A) (U.K.). 
315  GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 80; Nick McCarthy, Revealed: Police Secure 
Court Orders to Protect Victims of Forced Marriage, BIRMINGHAM MAIL (Jan. 4, 2017 12:48 
PM), https://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/midlands-news/revealed-police-secure-court-
orders-12403573 [https://perma.cc/5R3N-A4QP]. 
316  See supra Section I.E. 
317  See supra Section I.E. 
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any individual who is forcing or has forced another into a marriage would max-
imize the remedy’s efficacy. 
3. Forced Marriage as the Conduct 
A primary limitation of civil protection orders as a forced marriage remedy 
lies in the primacy placed on individual acts in lieu of the broader dynamic.318 
Protection order statutes require courts to parse respondents’ conduct to evalu-
ate whether any individual actions crossed the legal threshold qualifying a peti-
tioner for relief. This qualifying conduct test excludes individuals from relief 
who have a qualifying relationship with a respondent, and legitimately fear they 
are being forced into a marriage, but who have not been subjected to designated 
tactics (or at least not yet) The limited data available on forced marriage in the 
U.S. suggests that although physical violence is not rare, emotional and psycho-
logical tactics are far more prevalent.319 The focus on physical violence and 
criminal conduct in many states may make legal protection unavailable to indi-
viduals who have suffered non-violent means of coercion. Legal protection is 
perhaps similarly unavailable to those who have learned to act compliant after 
witnessing violence against older siblings who attempted to resist marriage, and 
thereby have avoided victimization themselves. 
To best protect against forced marriage, the law must recognize forced 
marriage as the harm to be prevented, whatever the tactics used to achieve that 
end. Thus, a court’s inquiry must center on whether a forced marriage is at risk 
or has occurred. “Force” should be defined broadly, to include emotional, psy-
chological, and financial means of coercion, as well as acts and threats of phys-
ical and sexual violence. Because plans for an individual’s marriage may be 
made years in advance of the marriage date, courts should be empowered to ex-
amine the totality of a respondent’s conduct over time when assessing whether 
it amounts to “force.” This analysis should be undertaken from the perspective 
of the petitioner, since whether a marriage is being forced upon an individual 
fundamentally depends on that individual’s understanding of the events and his 
or her own reaction to the plans (assuming that individual has some advanced 
knowledge).320 Focusing on a petitioner’s experience also might help courts to 
                                                        
318  Some states encourage courts to consider the full context of a relationship in determining 
whether particular allegations justify relief. See, e.g., Cruz-Foster v. Foster, 597 A.2d 927, 
930 (D.C. 1991) (holding that courts should be apprised of the entire mosaic of the parties’ 
relationship, not just isolated incidents, when assessing whether good cause exists to extend 
a CPO). 
319  See supra Section I.D. 
320  As stated by a young woman to a United Kingdom working group on forced marriage: 
“A person knows when they are being forced into a marriage against their will—that must be 
the starting point.” A CHOICE BY RIGHT, supra note 84, at 6. Adopting the petitioner’s per-
spective has similarly been suggested as a means of overcoming challenges to defining “co-
ercion” or “coercive control” as actionable qualifying conduct in protection orders statutes, 
given wide variations in the degree and subjective experience of control. GOODMARK, supra 
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distinguish between arranged marriages and forced ones. To this end, FMPO 
statutes should make actionable any intentional course of conduct causing a pe-
titioner to experience force to marry, with the intent inquiry requiring a finding 
that a respondent had a general intent to commit the acts that amount to force, 
not a specific intent to force a marriage.321 
In the domestic violence context, Professor Jeffrey Baker has argued for 
the opposite approach. Professor Baker proposes that states expand qualifying 
conduct in civil protection order statutes to include (non-criminal) coercion, 
which is defined according to the goals behind a perpetrator’s conduct.322 Pro-
fessor Baker’s approach is intended to avoid subjecting a petitioner to a poten-
tially stigmatizing examination of the extent of her subordination.323 This aim is 
worthy. In the FMPO context, however, requiring courts to find that a respond-
ent had a specific intent to force a child into a marriage would risk prioritizing 
the respondent’s own perception of his or her actions over the lived experiences 
of the victim. Professor Baker’s proposal appears to preclude relief in the do-
mestic violence context if a perpetrator does not view his or her motivations in 
the manner ascribed.324 Professor Leigh Goodmark notes that although intent to 
control has been widely ascribed to perpetrators of abuse, findings in the psy-
chological and social science fields suggest that both those inflicting and sub-
jected to domestic abuse do not necessarily identify control as a motivating 
force in their experiences.325 This disconnect is likely to arise in the forced mar-
riage context as well, as perpetrators of forced marriage reportedly often be-
lieve they are doing nothing wrong.326 
                                                                                                                                 
note 119, at 48–49; Tamara L. Kuennen, Analyzing the Impact of Coercion on Domestic Vio-
lence Victims: How Much Is Too Much?, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER, L. & JUST. 2, 11 (2007). 
321  This proposed language builds from Professor Goodmark’s proposed alternative con-
struction of actionable non-criminal coercion as qualifying conduct in domestic violence 
protection order statutes. Professor Goodmark proposes to make actionable “any intentional 
course of action that causes a petitioner to experience a loss of liberty, freedom, or autono-
my” and limiting examination of the perpetrator’s intent to whether the conduct was inten-
tional, regardless of its motivation. GOODMARK, supra note 119, at 50. 
322  Jeffrey R. Baker, Enjoining Coercion: Squaring Civil Protection Orders with the Reality 
of Domestic Abuse, 11 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 35, 58 (2008). 
323  Id. at 59. 
324  GOODMARK, supra note 119, at 48. 
325  Id. 
326  Alanen, supra note 11, at 12; see also, e.g., Marriage or Rape?, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 15, 
1996, 7:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/marriage-or-rape-175142 [https://perma.cc/G7 
Y7-7FLU] (in case in which thirteen- and fourteen-year-old daughters were allegedly forced 
to marry substantially older men in Nebraska, which resulted in the conviction of the hus-
bands for rape and charges against the parents for child abuse and contributing to the delin-
quency of a minor, the adults involved were reported to have believed they did nothing 
wrong). 
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4. Targeted Solutions 
Forced Marriage Protection Orders should be structured to encourage 
courts to order relief that addresses the specific circumstances facing the peti-
tioner. Rather than mandate the inclusion of any particular remedies within 
FMPOs, statutes should follow the common domestic violence protection order 
model of listing possible remedies to help courts identify common needs. Such 
remedies should include provisions prohibiting a respondent from enabling or 
permitting a wedding to proceed, restricting travel, requiring the submission of 
a petitioner’s passport to the court, prohibiting parents from applying for a 
passport for a child, ordering the return of an individual who has been taken 
abroad, limiting contact between the respondent and the petitioner, ordering a 
respondent to stay away from a petitioner, prohibiting coercive or isolative 
conduct, or mandating that a petitioner continue to attend school.327 To maxim-
ize FMPOs’ agility to respond to a victim’s particularized needs, statutes also 
should authorize courts to make any other orders appropriate to the resolution 
of the case.328 Maximizing the adaptability of FMPOs to the needs and interests 
of each petitioner and encouraging courts to approach FMPOs as an individual-
ly tailored remedy could help to encourage more petitioners to seek relief. 
5. Publicizing Relief 
Individuals facing forced marriages often do not know that civil legal pro-
tections might be available to them.329 Legal and social service professionals 
attempting to assist potential victims are also often unsure or unaware of the 
potential for civil protection orders to provide relief.330 The ambiguity of exist-
ing laws as applied to forced marriage and minor petitioners only amplifies this 
uncertainty.331 Uncertainty regarding the viability of protection orders to pre-
vent forced marriage may discourage service providers from assisting potential 
victims to seek relief because of concerns about the likelihood of success, lack 
of organizational expertise, or alignment of the work with agency-mission or 
grant-funding mandates.332 Creating a specialized forced marriage protection 
order remedy (combined with a thoughtful public education campaign) would 
inform potential victims, service providers, and others who seek to help that le-
gal protections exist, as well as convey the state’s recognition of and commit-
                                                        
327  Landau, supra note 11, at 50; Alanen, supra note 11, at 12–13; CHERYL THOMAS ET AL., 
DEVELOPING LEGISLATION ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS 378–79 (May 2011), 
http://www.endvawnow.org/uploads/modules/pdf/1355776748.pdf [https://perma.cc/YV9E-
7HLH]. 
328  GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 75. 
329  Swegman, Forced Child Marriage Case Scenarios for Lisa Martin, supra note 58. 
330  Id. 
331  Id. 
332  Id. 
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ment to redressing the problem, which could encourage grant funders and ser-
vice organizations to expand their missions in turn. 
B. Evolution 
Many of the shortcomings of civil protection order statutes in the forced 
marriage context have been identified as undermining the efficacy of the reme-
dy to redress domestic violence as well.333 Addressing these issues in the forced 
marriage context may permit states to test out new approaches on a smaller 
scale that could support the evolution of civil protection order statutes to a 
more victim-centered model. 
1. Moving Away from the Criminal Paradigm 
A number of scholars have noted that whereas social scientists have come 
to understand domestic abuse as an ongoing campaign of coercive control334 or 
intimate terrorism335 employed to dominate and entrap an intimate partner with-
in the relationship, protection order statutes continue to define domestic vio-
lence by isolated acts of criminal conduct and physical violence.336 From a co-
ercive control perspective, physical force represents one possible tool among 
many non-criminal, non-violent tactics, all of which are aimed at establishing 
control and domination over another individual. Physical violence may be a 
component of a campaign of coercive control, but it is not necessary. It is the 
broader, unified motivation of control and dominance that makes a relationship 
abusive, rather than the use of particular tactics. The focus on individual actions 
obscures the broader dynamic of the relationship and excludes from protection 
individuals who are abused, disempowered, and subjugated in their relation-
ships but not through tactics that meet the legal standard. Centering court in-
quiries on isolated actions also inadvertently results in the issuance of orders 
against individuals who are primarily the targets of abuse within their relation-
ships if they have used force or made threats upon occasion—whether to de-
fend themselves or in the course of lashing out or asserting independence.337 In 
                                                        
333  GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 80; GOODMARK, supra note 119, at 34–35; John-
son, supra note 201, at 1111. 
334  Sociologist Evan Stark understands abuse as the employment of methods of coercion and 
control by men to entrap and dominate women in intimate relationships. EVAN STARK, 
COERCIVE CONTROL: HOW MEN ENTRAP WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE (2007). 
335  Sociologist Michael Johnson defines intimate terrorism as a form of domestic violence in 
which a range of tactics are used to establish power and control over an intimate partner. 
MICHAEL P. JOHNSON, A TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: INTIMATE TERRORISM, VIOLENT 
RESISTANCE, AND SITUATIONAL COUPLE VIOLENCE (2008). 
336  GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 79; GOODMARK, supra note 119, at 40; Johnson, 
supra note 201, at 1111; Kuennen, supra note 320, at 20–21. 
337  See Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When She 
Fights Back, 20 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 75, 76 (2008). 
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such cases, although an isolated act technically may satisfy the legal standard, 
issuance of a protection order does not advance the state’s goal in combating 
domestic violence, and it may undermine that goal by converting a protection 
order into another weapon for a perpetrator to manipulate.338 The creation of an 
FMPO remedy provides an opportunity to build a framework that focuses the 
court’s inquiry on the broader dynamic at play. 
2. Toward the Perspective of the Targeted 
Although protection order statutes were developed to advance the interests 
of individuals subjected to abuse, and the remedy has been recognized as the 
most victim-centered available,339 the current structure of the protection order 
remedy can subordinate the petitioner’s perspective and wishes. Defining do-
mestic violence from a criminal law lens has focused protection order proceed-
ings on the commission of particular acts rather than the total lived experience 
of the petitioner. Scholars have argued that the standardization of public and 
private systems’ response to domestic violence cases has directed attention 
away from the particular circumstances of the individuals subjected to abuse.340 
Such standardization manifests in the protection order context in limited defini-
tions of qualifying “abuse”; limited, pre-defined remedies; and policies that 
mandate arrest and “no-drop” prosecution of domestic violence offenses—
including violation of a protection order. Moreover, a number of scholars have 
noted that the systemic response to domestic violence has prioritized separation 
and safety at the expense of meeting the self-identified needs of those subjected 
to abuse, including the need to stay connected with their communities and those 
with whom they have intimate and familial relationships.341 The creation of 
                                                        
338  See Murphy v. Okeke, 951 A.2d 783, 785–86 (D.C. 2008) (overturning a lower court or-
der entering mutual civil protection orders against a petitioner and respondent upon a finding 
that the respondent was the primary aggressor, and holding that a court is not obligated to 
issue a civil protection order just because it finds that a qualifying offense occurred, instead, 
civil protection orders only should be issued when doing so advances the purpose of the In-
trafamily Offenses Act—to protect victims of abuse). 
339  Jane K. Stoever, Freedom from Violence: Using the Stages of Change Model to Realize 
the Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 303, 307 (2011). 
340  GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 91; Laurie S. Kohn, The Justice System and 
Domestic Violence: Engaging the Case but Divorcing the Victim, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 191, 194 (2008). 
341  GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 96; SUSAN SCHECTER, EXPANDING SOLUTIONS 
FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND POVERTY: WHAT BATTERED WOMEN WITH ABUSED CHILDREN 
NEED FROM THEIR ADVOCATES 7, 11 (2000); Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered 
Women: Law, Material Resources, and Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 
1019 (2000); Goldfarb, supra note 119, at 1488–89; Leigh Goodmark, Law Is the Answer? 
Do We Know that for Sure?: Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered 
Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 19 (2004); Margaret E. Johnson, Changing Course 
in the Anti-Domestic Violence Legal Movement: From Safety to Security, 60 VILL. L. REV. 
145, 146–47 (2015). 
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FMPOs offers the chance to create an injunctive remedy that centers the court’s 
inquiry and allocation of remedies on a petitioner’s experience and identified 
needs. 
3. Toward a Presumption of Access 
Protection order statutes undermine their efficacy for minors by excluding 
them from and restricting or failing to address the circumstances under which 
minors can access relief. This is troubling, as minors are at significant risk for 
abuse and frequently reluctant to seek adult intervention and support.342 In prac-
tice, ambiguity or silence regarding minors in protection order statutes may re-
sult in their exclusion from remedies, since courts and service providers who 
are uncertain about minors’ eligibility for relief may turn minors away.343 
Forced Marriage Protection Orders offer an opportunity to craft a remedy that 
encourages minors to seek legal protection by explicitly extending standing to 
all minors, and legal capacity to older minors to represent their own interests, 
should they choose to do so. To ensure that minors who want the assistance of a 
supportive adult in court proceedings can rely upon it, FMPOs also should 
grant standing to a broadly construed class of adult representatives to seek or-
ders on behalf of minors.344 To ensure that minors’ perspectives and wishes re-
main the focus in cases where adults represent minors’ interests, courts should 
be required to solicit the minor petitioner’s perspective on whether an FMPO 
should be issued and what remedies it should contain.345 When older minors 
appear in court without adult representatives, courts should be authorized to 
appoint attorneys to represent minors’ expressed interests in the proceeding.346 
Empowering adolescents with the autonomy to control the pursuit of civil rem-
edies to prevent their own forced marriages not only could encourage minors to 
seek relief but also would advance state policies that enable minors to act in 
their own interests to protect their safety, health, and welfare.347 
                                                        
342  Martin, supra note 105, at 459–60. 
343  Id. at 508. 
344  See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1005(a)(1)–(3) (2018) (permitting protection orders to be filed 
on behalf of minor petitioners by “a parent, guardian, custodian, or other appropriate adult”). 
345  See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1005(a)(1)–(3) (2018) (“[I]f a parent, guardian, custodian, or 
other appropriate adult has petitioned for civil protection on behalf of a minor petitioner 12 
years of age or older, the court shall consider the expressed wishes of the minor petitioner in 
deciding whether to issue an order pursuant to this section and in determining the contents of 
such an order.”). This approach also ensures that orders are sought on behalf of minors for 
reasons consistent with the purpose of the remedy. See, e.g., Claver v. Wilbur, 280 S.W.3d 
570, 570, 573 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008) (dismissing a civil protection order that a mother ob-
tained on behalf of her sixteen-year-old daughter against the daughter’s boyfriend on the 
grounds that “[t]he mere fact that [the minor’s] parents do not like appellant was not a proper 
ground upon which to issue an order of protection”). 
346  Martin, supra note 105, at 500. 
347  Brustin, supra note 243, at 351 (highlighting the continuing discussion in state legisla-
tures about when adolescents ought to be able to act autonomously); Jeruss, supra note 262, 
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C. Circumspection 
Several possible criticisms could be levied against the creation of forced 
marriage protection orders. 
1. Feasibility 
Recent expansions of the civil protection order remedy to encompass 
claims against stalking, harassment, and common partners has inundated some 
domestic violence courtrooms with cases involving mundane disputes between 
neighbors and love triangle jealousies that lack the coercive dynamics and in-
timate bonds that civil protection orders were intended to navigate.348 These 
expansions and their aftermath may have created protection order fatigue and 
could inspire a resistance to creating a new category of injunctive relief, partic-
ularly if at least some victims of forced marriage could seek relief under exist-
ing protection order statutes. 
These experiences or general “floodgates” concerns should not discourage 
enactment of forced marriage-specific relief. As both a form of violence in its 
own right and a precursor to physical and sexual abuse, forced marriage should 
be a problem of serious concern to states, and falls squarely within the range of 
problems the protection order remedy was created to address. Although anec-
dotal evidence and the limited existing quantitative data point to forced mar-
riage as a persistent problem, there are no indications that it is of a magnitude 
that would overwhelm the courts. Investments in effective mechanisms to pre-
vent forced marriage can mitigate and avoid significant harms to individuals 
and future offspring, and associated costs to states. 
2. Enforceability 
Civil protection orders have proved an effective remedy, in part, because of 
their robust enforceability. Protection orders generally are enforceable through 
                                                                                                                                 
at 895 (detailing the passage of mature-minor statutes in recent years and noting that “[a]ll of 
these statutes have converged on the idea that there are certain areas where minors need pro-
tection from harm. In these areas, minors are granted the rights to make important decisions 
without notifying their parents”); see Caitlin M. Cullitan, Please Don’t Tell My Mom! A Mi-
nor’s Right to Informational Privacy, 40 J.L. & EDUC. 417, 444 (2011) (observing that in the 
context of healthcare, teens are deterred from seeking treatment for sexually transmitted in-
fections by fear of disclosure, leading states to eliminate parental-consent requirements for 
such treatment); Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Decisional Autonomy for Medical Care: 
Physician Perceptions and Practices, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 87, 92–93 (2001) (dis-
cussing how state legislatures have lowered or eliminated the age at which teens may con-
sent to treatment in an effort to encourage teens to access mental-health services); Susan D. 
Hawkins, Note, Protecting the Rights and Interests of Competent Minors in Litigated Medi-
cal Treatment Disputes, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2075, 2123 (1996) (explaining that mature-
minor medical statutes encourage minors to seek medical care that they would not if parental 
consent were needed). 
348  See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1001 (2018). 
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civil and criminal contempt proceedings, and violations of protection orders al-
so often constitute a distinct criminal offense.349 The full faith and credit re-
quirement of the federal Violence Against Women Act ensures that protection 
orders are enforceable across state lines.350 
In light of the common resistance to criminal prosecution of those facing 
forced marriages and the historical ineffectiveness of criminal laws at penaliz-
ing forced marriage, states should think carefully about whether to similarly 
criminalize violations of forced marriage protection orders. If FMPO violations 
are criminalized, such offenses should not be subject to mandatory arrest and 
no drop prosecution policies, which could strongly deter use of the FMPO rem-
edy, especially among immigrant communities. 
It might be argued that failing to criminalize FMPO violations would set up 
FMPOs as a “lesser” form of protection order, thereby sending the message that 
forced marriage is a “lesser” form of domestic abuse.351 Others might object 
that vesting control over enforcement in the petitioner leaves the petitioner vul-
nerable to a respondent’s attempts to persuade or coerce her to dismiss en-
forcement proceedings.352 Some might also question the efficacy of protection 
orders if petitioners have sole enforcement discretion and a reluctance to exer-
cise that right.353 Yet, the history of forced marriage prosecution in the U.S. and 
the U.K. to date suggests that criminalization efforts may have more symbolic 
than practical value.354 Moreover, in light of the common need for emergency 
                                                        
349  PROTECTION ORDER VIOLATIONS MATRIX, NAT’L CTR. ON PROTECTION ORDERS & FULL 
FAITH & CREDIT (2014), http://www.bwjp.org/assets/documents/pdfs/protection_order_viola 
tions_matrix.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7TD-PRAU]; David M. Zlotnick, Empowering the Bat-
tered Woman: The Use of Criminal Contempt Sanctions to Enforce Civil Protection Orders, 
56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1153, 1194 (1995); Klein & Orloff, supra note 115, at 1101-02. 
350  18 U.S.C. § 2265 (2012). See generally FULL FAITH AND CREDIT FOR PROTECTION 
ORDERS: ASSISTING SURVIVORS WITH ENFORCEMENT ACROSS JURISDICTIONAL LINES, NAT’L 
CTR. ON PROTECTION ORDERS & FULL FAITH & CREDIT, http://www.bwjp.org/assets/docu 
ments/pdfs/ffc_advocate_guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZHR3-UYAF] [Hereinafter FULL 
FAITH AND CREDIT FOR PROTECTION ORDERS]. 
351  Cf. RUTH GAFFNEY-RHYS, REPORT FOR THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS: FORCED MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND AND WALES: CHALLENGES, ACHIEVEMENTS, 
BEST PRACTICES AND IMPLEMENTATION GAPS (2013). 
352  A WRONG NOT A RIGHT, supra note 16; HOME OFFICE, FORCED MARRIAGE 
CONSULTATION, (2011) [hereinafter FORCED MARRIAGE CONSULTATION]; HOME OFFICE, 
FORCED MARRIAGE: A CONSULTATION—SUMMARY OF RESPONSES (2012); Robert F. Fried-
man, Protecting Victims from Themselves, but Not Necessarily from Abusers: Issuing a No-
Contact Order over the Objection of the Victim-Spouse, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 235 
(2010). 
353  FORCED MARRIAGE CONSULTATION, supra note 352, at 6 (noting that from Nov. 2008 to 
Dec. 2011 only five FMPO breaches reported, and only one civil contempt proceeding was 
brought for a violation). 
354  THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON FORCED MARRIAGES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND SOME 
RECOMMENDATIONS, SAVE YOUR RIGHTS 10 (2011), http://www.saveyourrights.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/SYR-REPORT-as-printed.pdf [https://perma.cc/JVD3-74ZX] (not-
ing that need for cooperation of forced marriage victim may make value of forced marriage 
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intervention, such as when forced marriage is imminent, it is critical that pre-
ventive policies are designed to encourage individuals to come forward and 
seek assistance. Separating FMPOs from possible criminal penalties eliminates 
a possible barrier to seeking relief. Finally, electing not to criminalize FMPO 
violations would not immunize perpetrators from criminal penalties. Even if 
FMPO violations themselves are not criminalized, any violation that constitutes 
another criminal offense, such as assault, threats, or stalking, would be grounds 
for prosecution in its own right. 
Furthermore, to ensure FMPOs have a deterrent effect on respondents, 
FMPOs should be enforceable through criminal and civil contempt proceedings 
initiated by the petitioner. The Violence Against Women Act’s definition of 
“protection” order is sufficiently broad that its full faith and credit provisions 
should encompass FMPOs, and thereby ensure that FMPO petitioners remain 
protected when they cross state lines.355 
3. Desirability 
Some might also object that the legal system should not be looked to as a 
primary solution for forced marriage. A number of scholars have argued that 
“overreliance on the legal system has stunted the development” of other means 
of addressing the problem.356 A similar emphasis on developing effective legal 
interventions may funnel resources away from the development of creative 
non-legal interventions.357 
It is also not clear whether those who could be eligible for FMPOs would 
pursue them in significant numbers. During the first thirty months when 
FMPOs were available in the United Kingdom, only 339 FMPOs were granted, 
                                                                                                                                 
criminal offense, like the female genital mutilation criminal offense, of greater symbolic than 
practical value). 
355  18 U.S.C. § 2266(5)(A)(2012) (“protection order includes . . . any injunction, restraining 
order, or any other order issued by a civil or criminal court for the purpose of preventing vio-
lent or threatening acts or harassment against, sexual violence, or contact or communication 
with or physical proximity to, another person, including any temporary or final order issued 
by a civil or criminal court whether obtained by filing an independent action or as a pendente 
lite order in another proceeding so long as any civil or criminal order was issued in response 
to a complaint, petition, or motion filed by or on behalf of a person seeking protection. . . .”); 
18 U.S.C. § 2265(a) (2012) (“Any protection order issued that is consistent with subsection 
(b) of this section by the court of one State, Indian tribe, or territory (the issuing State, Indian 
tribe, or territory) shall be accorded full faith and credit by the court of another State, Indian 
tribe, or territory (the enforcing State, Indian tribe, or territory) and enforced by the court and 
law enforcement personnel of the other State, Indian tribal government or Territory as if it 
were the order of the enforcing State or tribe.”). See generally FULL FAITH AND CREDIT FOR 
PROTECTION ORDERS, supra note 350, at 3. 
356  GOODMARK, supra note 119, at 6; see also GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at 74. 
Professor Margaret Johnson has argued that domestic violence interventions also have been 
dominated by a focus on short-term safety, as defined by the state, to the detriment of the 
long-term security of individuals subjected to abuse. Johnson, supra note 341, at 165. 
357  Johnson, supra note 341, at 157. 
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despite estimates that 5,000 to 8,000 forced marriages occur and the govern-
ment’s Forced Marriage Unit fields approximately 1,700 calls for assistance 
annually.358 Yet, the number of orders sought far exceeded initial expectations 
that “there would be between 5 and 50 application a year.”359 The same con-
cerns about harming or bringing shame upon family members that make crimi-
nal intervention undesirable might deter those facing forced marriages from ap-
proaching the legal system under any circumstances. Reluctance to approach 
the justice system may be amplified for members of immigrant communities in 
the United States as a result of recent policies promoting enforcement opera-
tions.360 Finally, some might be concerned that creating policies to address 
forced marriage could stigmatize communities in which forced marriage is a 
problem, in some cases compounding existing challenges faced by religious 
and cultural minorities.361 
These are important concerns but none should deter the creation of 
FMPOs. At present, no readily accessible remedy exists that can be relied upon 
to prevent a forced marriage. Only a small number of states enable intervention 
into a forced marriage where the coercion at play has not manifested in acts or 
threats of physical violence. Thus, the establishment of an FMPO remedy cre-
ates a benefit for those facing forced marriage no matter how infrequently the 
remedy is used, because it will offer legal relief to individuals who otherwise 
may have no viable legal remedy. The likelihood that the remedy may be infre-
quently used brings the potential benefit of not imposing a significant addition-
al burden on court resources. 
To encourage use of the remedy by those who could benefit, states should 
undertake education campaigns to inform the community about FMPOs—
taking care to frame the problem across a range of contexts—and simultaneous-
ly raise awareness about the problem of forced marriage and the rights of indi-
viduals to choose their own spouses. Community organizations could also part-
                                                        
358  FORCED MARRIAGE CONSULTATION, supra note 352, at 6; GAFFNEY-RHYS, supra note 
351. 
359  Teertha Gupta & Khatun Sapnara, The Law, the Courts, and Their Effectiveness, in 
FORCED MARRIAGE, INTRODUCING A SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 159 
(Aisha K. Gill & Sundari Anitha eds. 2011) (“In part, the [Forced Marriage Protection] Act 
was intended to have symbolic as much as practical force (i.e. a deterrent effect) in order to 
raise awareness.”). 
360  Tom Dart, Fearing Deportation, Undocumented Immigrants Wary of Reporting Crimes, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 23, 2017, 6:30 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/23/ 
undocumented-immigrants-wary-report-crimes-deportation [https://perma.cc/2LUA-FQD5]; 
Jennifer Medina, Too Scared to Report Sexual Abuse. The Fear: Deportation, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/30/us/immigrants-deportation-sexual-
abuse.html [https://perma.cc/R2E2-DPWM]; Maya Rhodan, Deportation Fears Silence 
Some Domestic Violence Victims, TIME (May 30, 2017), http://www.time.com/4798422/ 
domestic-violence-deportation-immigration [https://perma.cc/HVE5-CCYU]. 
361  A CHOICE BY RIGHT, supra note 84, at 12 (“The Working Group is clear that the issue of 
forced marriage should not be used to stigmatise any community.”). 
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ner with community members to organize around the problem and identify 
common needs and workable interventions. Rather than relying on FMPOs as a 
one-size-fits-all solution, state governments and private foundations should in-
vest in research to better understand the scope of the problem and the needs of 
those subjected to it, and should dedicate funding to programs committed to 
developing creative responses to address the needs identified.362 
CONCLUSION 
Forced marriage is a serious form of violence that the United States is cur-
rently failing to address. Yet, its widespread existence should be a call to politi-
cal action. Given the enduring harms suffered by those forced into marriages 
and the challenges of securing the return of persons taken abroad against their 
will, efforts to combat the problem should prioritize prevention. Civil protec-
tion orders provide the best opportunity for relief under existing laws, and they 
are an appropriate and workable remedy for some facing forced marriage today. 
But, the general viability of civil protection orders to prevent forced marriage 
varies widely across states, particularly for minors. Adults being coerced by 
parents, other relatives, or household members through acts and threats of 
physical violence, stalking, or harassment are best positioned to secure relief 
through civil protection orders. Minors who are being coerced through emo-
tional, psychological, and financial means as well as those being coerced by in-
tended spouses or other third parties face a harder road and may be excluded 
from the remedy in many states. 
States must recognize forced marriage itself as the harm to be prevented 
and combatted. The creation of specialized forced marriage protection orders 
would make legal protection more accessible and responsive to the needs of 
those facing forced marriages. Moreover, taking this step offers states the op-
portunity to implement lessons learned in the domestic violence context and 
refine the protection order remedy to redress past concerns. To maximize their 
utility to prevent forced marriage, FMPOs should focus the legal inquiry on the 
experience of the petitioner, define actionable harm according to the dynamics 
of the problem (rather than the criminal code), accord minors a clear path to le-
gal relief, and grant courts the latitude to order creative solutions. Legal reme-
dies are a last resort for those facing forced marriages and should not be relied 
upon as an isolated strategy to address the problem. Government and private 
resources should be devoted to studying the extent and nature of the problem 
and understanding the needs and interventions desired by those facing it. Such 
                                                        
362  Lack of information about the problem of forced marriage is an obstacle to an effective 
response to the problem in the United States. The U.K. previously faced this same challenge. 
Id. (“The Working Group has found that there is a lack of reliable data on the cases of forced 
marriage, and that this lack of information has been a barrier to: recognition of the problem, 
getting commitment to tackling it, securing the right skills and resources to take effective 
action, [and] planning the provision of services for victims.”). 
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data along with collaborative efforts with impacted communities should guide 
the development of additional preventive strategies. 
It was not too long ago that all fifty states created civil protection orders to 
prevent and intervene in domestic abuse because existing remedies were an in-
complete fit to address the problem. Today, the emergence of another signifi-
cant threat to individual autonomy, health, and well-being calls for a similar, 
unified state response and a new generation of protection orders targeted to re-














































































































































































































































































                                                        
* This chart tracks only relationships potentially relevant to circumstances of forced marriage, and omits relationships, such as sharing a child in common, less likely to apply to individuals seek-
ing protection from forced marriage. 
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*  This chart summarizes only statutory provisions that designate adult representatives. Italics indicate that a statute is silent on this topic. In some states, judicial bench books and court rules pro-
vide additional guidance on this topic. 
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*  This chart aggregates the types of conduct that may trigger a claim for a protection order across all protection order categories and all qualifying relationships in each jurisdiction. The types of 
conduct that justify relief may vary according to the relationship between the parties or the type of protection order sought (e.g., stalking may not justify the issuance of a domestic violence protec-
tion order, but may justify the issuance of a stalking protection order in a particular jurisdiction). 
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NN. §§ 36-3-601, 36-3-602 (2017). 
496  TEX. FAM. C
ODE. A
NN. § 71.004 (W
est 2017); TEX. C
ODE C





















































































                                                         
498  V
T. STAT. A














ODE § 48-27-202 (2017). 
502  W
IS. STAT. §§ 48.02, 813.12, 813.125 (2017). 
503  W
YO. STAT. A




PPENDIX 4: STATE PROTECTION O
RDER STATUTES EXPLICITLY A







LA. CODE § 30-5-5 (2017). 




NN. § 9-15-201 (2017). 
M
arried and unmarried minors denied capacity to seek relief. 
California 




inors twelve and older have capacity to seek relief within all qualifying relationships in domestic violence, 
harassment, and workplace violence protection orders. 
D.C. 
D.C. CODE A
NN. § 16-1003 (2018). 
M
inors twelve and older have capacity to seek relief against spouses, those with whom they have a child in 
common, and dating partners; minors sixteen and older also have capacity to seek relief against relatives, co-




NN. §§ 46:2132, 46:2133 (2017). 




E. STAT. tit. 19a, §§ 4002, 4005 (2017). 




INN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2017). 
M
inors sixteen and older have capacity to seek relief against current or former spouses and persons with whom 

















O. REV. STAT. § 455.010 (2017). 
M




N.H. REV. STAT. A
NN. § 173-B:7 (2017). 
M
inors of any age have capacity to seek relief against current and former intimate partners and spouses. 
New Jersey 
N.J. STAT. A




inors who are emancipated by marriage, pregnancy, having a child, military service, or court order have ca-
pacity to seek relief within all qualifying relationships.  
Oklahoma 
O
KLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 142A-4 (2017). 
M




R. REV. STAT. § 163.763 (2018). 
M
inors twelve and older have capacity to seek sexual abuse protection orders against non-family or household 
members over eighteen years of age. 
Pennsylvania 
23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6106 (2018). 
Emancipated minors have capacity to seek relief within all qualifying relationships. 
South Dako-
ta 
Beermann v. Beermann, 559 N.W
.2d 868, 
870–71 (S.D. 1997).  
Statute silent but Supreme Court held that where a minor seeks a civil protection order without an adult repre-
sentative, trial courts have the discretion to appoint a guardian ad litem or conclude that no guardian is neces-
sary or permit the minor to proceed alone. 
Tennessee 
TENN. CODE A
NN. § 36-3-601 (2017). 
Emancipated minors have capacity to seek relief within all qualifying relationships. 
Texas 
TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. A




inors of any age have capacity to seek relief against dating partners, minors seventeen and older have capaci-








inors sixteen and older and emancipated minors have capacity to seek relief against spouses, those with 
whom they live “as if a spouse,” relatives (excluding parents and minor siblings), those with whom they share 













inors of any age have capacity to seek relief against dating partners. M
inors sixteen and older have capacity 





ASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.020 (2017). 
M
inors sixteen and older have capacity to seek relief against parents, grandparents, those with whom they 




Katherine B.T. v. Jackson, 640 S.E.2d 569, 
576–577 (W
. Va. 2006). 
Statute silent but state Supreme Court held that minors have capacity to file for domestic violence protection 










































































































































































































































































                                                        
*  This chart tracks only relationships potentially relevant to circumstances of forced marriage, and omits relationships, such as sharing a child in common, unlikely to apply to individuals seeking 
protection from forced marriage. 
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